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THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINES 
JOHN HARRISON* 
Much that is said about the political question doctrine is wrong.  The doctrine 
as the Supreme Court has developed it is not a limit on the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the federal courts.  It is, however, a limit on judicial power in its 
relations with political power.  The doctrine has two branches.  In one, courts 
treat certain legal decisions by political actors as conclusive.  The leading 
example is recognition of states and governments, as to which the courts are 
bound by non-judicial decisions.  In the other branch, the mandatory remedies 
that courts may give are limited in the extent to which they may direct political 
actors with respect to highly sensitive discretionary decisions, mainly those 
involving military and security matters.  The doctrine’s rationale is that in some 
unusual circumstances the law commits final decision of a legal question to a 
non-judicial decision maker, as with Senate impeachment trials, and that the 
distinction between judicial and political power implies some limits on the extent 
to which the courts can command the exercise of the latter.  A substantial number 
of lower court decisions have seriously misunderstood the doctrine by treating it 
as a limit on subject matter jurisdiction.  In the name of the political question 
doctrine, lower courts have refused to reach the merits of claims on grounds that 
have no foundation in the Court’s cases or Article III. 
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To bring order out of chaos is the work of deity.  To bring chaos out 
of order requires some other hand.  The Supreme Court’s cases 
decided on the basis of the political question doctrine are orderly.  
They reflect a coherent account of the difference between judicial and 
political power, and the limits on judicial decision making that result 
from that difference.  Those cases do not treat the doctrine as a limit 
on the federal courts’ jurisdiction.  Commentators, lower federal 
courts, and the Court itself in its dicta, have often lost sight of that 
order.  As a result, the lower courts, in the name of the political 
question doctrine, have found limits on their own jurisdiction that are 
not founded in the Court’s decisions or Article III of the Constitution. 
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This Article’s title is in the plural because it describes what the 
Supreme Court’s political question doctrine is, what it was, and what it 
is not.  It also discusses the political question doctrine of many lower 
federal courts, explaining what it is but should not be, because it is 
contrary to the Supreme Court’s cases and Article III. 
 Part I describes what the Supreme Court’s political question 
doctrine is.  The Court has relied on the doctrine in two contexts.  Most 
of its cases under that rubric assign to a non-judicial actor the final 
authority to apply legal rules to particular facts.  In the second context, 
the doctrine limits the courts’ ability to give mandatory prospective 
relief that would control political actors’ decisions concerning military 
and national security matters.  Contrary to commentators, lower 
courts, and the Court’s dicta, the doctrine is not a limit on the 
jurisdiction of Article III courts.  It applies in three configurations, 
none of which involves constitutional limits on subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Part I concludes by explaining the principles underlying 
the Court’s decisions, and the derivation of those principles from the 
separation of judicial and political power. 
Part II describes what the political question doctrine once was, 
explaining that the canonical political question case of Georgia v. 
Stanton1 would today be understood as turning on standing.  The Court 
still takes the position that certain political rights may not be vindicated 
by the federal courts, but now does so under the rubric of standing. 
Part III deals with what the political question doctrine is in the lower 
courts, but should not be because that is not what it is in the Supreme 
Court or the Constitution.  A substantial number of lower courts have 
found that the political question doctrine deprives them of jurisdiction 
under Article III to resolve cases involving liability, including the 
personal monetary liability of federal officials, arising from the foreign 
relations and national security operations of the United States.  Those 
decisions rest on a misunderstanding of the political question 
doctrine, and in particular the Court’s discussion of it in Baker v. Carr,2 
and are not justified under Article III. 
I.   WHAT THE DOCTRINE IS 
This Part begins by describing the content of the Supreme Court’s 
political question doctrine.  It then shows that the Court’s cases that 
rely on the doctrine do not treat it as a limit on the jurisdiction of the 
                                               
 1. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1868). 
 2. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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Article III courts.  Part I concludes by explaining how the doctrine is 
derived from the relationship between judicial and political power 
under the Constitution. 
A.   The Substance of the Political Question Doctrine 
The Court’s political question cases fall into two categories.3  In most 
of the cases, some political actor’s decision applying law to fact is 
accorded the finality that the courts’ judgments enjoy.  The Court has 
also found that the doctrine limits courts’ power to give prospective 
remedies that control political discretion with respect to military matters.4 
1.   Non-judicial finality 
“We have said that ‘In determining whether a question falls within 
[the political question] category, the appropriateness under our 
system of government of attributing finality to the action of the 
political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a 
judicial determination are dominant considerations.’”5  The Court has 
attributed finality to political actors’ application of law to fact in three 
circumstances: (1) when questions of sovereignty and relations among 
sovereigns are at stake; (2) when the case involves the process of legal 
enactment; and (3) when the Constitution explicitly designates a 
house of Congress as judge, either of its own members’ elections or of 
impeachments in the Senate. 
                                               
 3. In Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277, 306 (2004), a plurality of the Court found 
that Equal Protection challenges to partisan gerrymandering present nonjusticiable 
political questions because of the substance of judgments that the courts must make 
when assessing such issues.  An opinion of the Court to that effect would have resulted 
in a third branch of the political question doctrine, which, like the other two, would 
not be a limit on the courts’ jurisdiction. 
 4. For a brief discussion of the political question doctrine that identifies these 
two branches, see John Harrison, The Relation Between Limitations on and Requirements of 
Article III Jurisdiction, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1367, 1372–75 (2007).  Professor Tara Grove has 
recently explored the political question doctrine as a principle of non-judicial finality.  
Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908 
(2015).  Professor Grove maintains that in the nineteenth century the doctrine 
functioned that way, but that the modern version differs substantially from the earlier 
version.  Id. at 1913–14.  As I will explain, the Court’s decisions continue to treat the 
political question doctrine as a source of non-judicial finality.  Some dicta characterize 
the doctrine as a limitation on the Article III jurisdiction of the federal courts, but the 
Court has in fact never held that it is.  As I will also explain, so to hold would be 
inconsistent with Article III. 
 5. Baker, 369 U.S. at 210 (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454–55 (1939)). 
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a. Recognition of sovereignty and sovereign relations 
Many of the Court’s political question cases treat a decision made by 
the political branches concerning sovereignty, sovereign power, and 
sovereign relations as conclusive.  The existence of states, 
governments, and quasi-sovereigns, such as Indian tribes, and the 
relations of war and peace among sovereigns, are questions the courts 
will not decide for themselves when an authoritative political actor has 
answered the question.6 
At the head of this doctrinal line is Luther v. Borden,7 in which the 
Court said that the judiciary should take as dispositive the political 
branches’ resolution of a disputed question and decide the merits on 
the basis of that resolution.8  Luther was a trespass action in the federal 
diversity jurisdiction in which, as Chief Justice Taney dryly put it, the 
questions before the Court were “not such as commonly arise in an 
action of trespass.”9  Those uncommon questions concerned the 
identity of the lawful government of Rhode Island.10 
Luther arose out of the political disturbances in Rhode Island in 1841 
and 1842, now known as the Dorr Rebellion.11  Dissatisfied with their 
state’s constitutional system, which rested on its original colonial 
Charter, a group of Rhode Islanders, led by Thomas Dorr, sought to 
change Rhode Island’s Constitution through a direct act of popular 
sovereignty.12  Without the legislature’s authorization, they convened 
a constitutional convention, drafted a constitution, and submitted it to 
a vote that they claimed was a referendum of the people.13  When that 
                                               
 6.  
Recognition is a sovereign’s official acceptance of a status under international 
law.  A sovereign might recognize a foreign entity as a state, a regime as the 
other state’s government, a place as part of the other state’s territory, rebel 
forces in the other state as a belligerent power, and so on. 
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2118 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 2 
MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 1 (1963)); see also Baker, 369 
U.S. at 215–17; Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 35–37 (1849). 
 7. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). 
 8. Id. at 47. 
 9. Id. at 35. 
 10. Id. at 35, 38–39. 
 11. Id. at 37. 
 12. Id. at 35, 37. 
 13. Id. at 36. 
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referendum approved the new constitution, the insurgents formed a 
government under it, electing Thomas Dorr as Governor.14 
As far as the government under the Charter was concerned, these 
proceedings were illegal and void, and the Dorr government’s 
organization of a militia was an act of rebellion.15  When Governor King 
of the Charter government sought aid from the federal government, 
President Tyler responded that although he did not think that the 
Dorrites’ conduct to that point had amounted to actual insurrection, 
should an insurrection commence, he would authorize the use of 
federal force under the statutes concerning civil disturbances in the 
states.16  The Charter legislature proclaimed martial law and a militia 
force, under Luther Borden, broke into the house of Martin Luther, a 
Dorr supporter.17  Eventually, peace was restored, and a new 
constitution with a broader franchise was drafted and approved by a 
referendum arranged by the Charter legislature.  That constitution 
went into effect in 1843.18 
Also in 1843, Luther, now a citizen of Massachusetts, sued Borden 
for trespass in federal diversity jurisdiction.19  At trial, Borden justified 
breaking into Luther’s house on the grounds that he had acted lawfully 
as a member of the militia under martial law.20  Luther replied that the 
Charter government was not lawful, having been replaced by the 
people with the Dorr government, so it could not authorize Borden’s 
                                               
 14. WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 91, 95 
(1972); see also Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 35–37. 
 15. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 36–37. 
 16. WIECEK, supra note 14, at 104; see also Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 44. 
 17. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 34.  Compare Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 33–34 
(providing that Borden claimed to be looking for Luther himself), with WIECEK, supra 
note 14, at 113–14 (explaining that Borden and his fellow militia members were 
looking for incriminating evidence). 
 18. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 37. 
 19. Id. at 1; WIECEK, supra note 14, at 114. 
 20. WIECEK, supra note 14, at 114–15. 
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acts.21  The circuit court directed the jury that Borden’s plea of official 
privilege was good and entered judgment for the defendant.22 
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s disposition on the 
merits.23  The Court did not, however, decide for itself whether the 
Charter government had been the lawful government of Rhode Island.  
Chief Justice Taney, speaking for the Court, concluded that the 
identity of the lawful government of a state was a political question to 
be decided by the political branches of the federal government, whose 
decision would bind the courts.24  He maintained that under the 
Guarantee Clause of Article IV, “it rests with Congress to decide what 
government is the established one in a State.  For as the United States 
guarantee to each State a republican government, Congress must 
necessarily decide what government is established in the State before 
it can determine whether it is republican or not.”25  From the 
beginning, Congress had admitted Senators and Representatives 
elected from Rhode Island under the Charter government.  “And when 
the senators and representatives of a State are admitted into the 
councils of the Union, the authority of the government under which 
they are appointed, as well as its republican character, is recognized by 
the proper constitutional authority.”26  Although “Congress was not 
called upon to decide the controversy” because the Dorr government 
                                               
 21. 
The plaintiff contends that the charter government was displaced, and ceased 
to have any lawful power, after the organization, in May, 1842, of the 
government which he supported, and although that government never was 
able to exercise any authority in the State, nor to command obedience to its 
laws or to its officers, yet he insists that it was the lawful and established 
government, upon the ground that it was ratified by a large majority of the 
male people of the State of the age of twenty-one and upwards, and also by a 
majority of those who were entitled to vote for general officers under the then 
existing laws of the State. 
Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 38; see also WIECEK, supra note 14, at 115. 
 22. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 38. 
 23. Id. at 38, 47 (upholding the defendant’s plea of justification and affirming the 
decision of the Circuit Court on the merits of the case). 
 24. Id. at 47 (“[W]hether they have changed [the form of government] or not by 
abolishing an old government, and establishing a new one in its place, is a question to 
be settled by the political power.  And when that power has decided, the courts are 
bound to take notice of its decision, and to follow it.”). 
 25. Id. at 42. 
 26. Id. 
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did not last long enough to elect Senators and Representatives, “the 
right to decide is placed there, and not in the courts.”27 
By statute, Congress had authorized the President to call out the 
militia to suppress insurrection.28  That too implied finality in a 
political actor.  “He is to act upon the application of the legislature or 
of the executive, and consequently he must determine what body of 
men constitute the legislature, and who is the governor, before he can 
act.”29  President Tyler had stated that if necessary he would call out 
the militia in support of Governor King and the Charter government.30  
That determination bound the courts.31 
When the President recognizes a foreign government or the 
government of a state, he makes a legal judgment concerning specific 
facts.  Indeed, the Chief Justice noted that Congress could have required 
the judiciary rather than the President to decide whether an insurrection 
had occurred, and in the process to determine which organization was 
the rightful government of a state.32  Congress had not done so, but 
the possibility that the function could have been assigned to the 
judiciary shows that it is one a court can in principle perform. 
The Chief Justice agreed with the Dorr rebels that the people of a 
state may change their government at their pleasure. 
But whether they have changed it or not by abolishing an old 
government, and establishing a new one in its place, is a question to 
be settled by the political power.  And when that power has decided, 
the courts are bound to take notice of its decision, and to follow it.33 
                                               
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 43. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 44. 
 31.  
For certainly no court of the United States, with a knowledge of this decision, 
would have been justified in recognizing the opposing party as the lawful 
government; or in treating as wrongdoers or insurgents the officers of the 
government which the President had recognized . . . .  In the case of foreign 
nations, the government acknowledged by the President is always recognized 
in the courts of justice. 
Id. 
 32. Id. at 43 (“They might, if they had deemed it most advisable to do so, have 
placed it in the power of a court to decide when the contingency [of insurrection] had 
happened which required the federal government to interfere.  But Congress thought 
otherwise, and no doubt wisely . . . .”). 
 33. Id. at 47. 
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Accepting the political branches’ answer to that question, the Court 
then rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that martial law had been 
improperly imposed and affirmed the decision below.34 
Because of Luther, federal recognition of state governments has 
become linked with the United States’ obligation under Article IV to 
guarantee every state a republican form of government.  Chief Justice 
Taney said that when Congress admits the senators and representatives 
of a state, the republican form of its government is conclusively 
established.35  The connection was manifest in the dispute over the 
Military Reconstruction Acts.  In those statutes, Congress stated that no 
legal state governments existed in ten ex-Confederate states, and that 
military supervision was needed until “loyal and republican” state 
governments could be established.36  Supporters of military 
reconstruction maintained that under Luther, congressional 
recognition of the new governments to be created under congressional 
direction would be binding on the courts.37  The Supreme Court never 
resolved the issue in the nineteenth century, but Luther did figure 
centrally in an early twentieth century case concerning the Guarantee 
Clause and direct democracy. 
In Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Oregon,38 Oregon 
imposed a tax on corporations, including the Pacific States Telephone 
                                               
 34. Id. at 45–47.  Justice Woodbury agreed that the identity of the lawful 
government was a political question, as to which courts were bound by the decisions 
of political actors. 
[W]e cannot rightfully settle those grave political questions which, in this case, 
have been discussed in connection with the new constitution; and, as judges, 
our duty is to take for a guide the decision made on them by the proper 
political powers, and, whether right or wrong according to our private 
opinions, enforce it till duly altered. 
Id. at 56 (Woodbury, J., dissenting).  Justice Woodbury differed from the majority on 
the question of martial law, which he thought had been improperly invoked by the 
Charter government.  Id. at 63–64. 
 35. Id. at 42.  In the public debate over the Dorr Rebellion, some supporters of 
Dorr argued that the Charter government was unrepublican under Article IV.  WIECEK, 
supra note 14, at 90.  Professor Grove maintains that the Court’s discussion of the 
Guarantee Clause was a dictum, saying that the plaintiffs did not rely on that argument.  
GROVE, supra note 4, at 1927–28.  The question was relevant to the outcome:  the Court 
could have concluded that the Charter government was unlawful because it was 
unrepublican.  Had the parties raised the issue, the Court would have properly addressed it. 
 36. Act to Provide for the More Efficient Government of the Rebel States, ch. 153, 
14 Stat. 428 (1867). 
 37. See John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 375, 414–18 (2001). 
 38. 223 U.S. 118 (1912). 
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Company, via the initiative process.39  In a collection action brought by 
the state, the company argued that the tax was invalid because direct 
democracy is unrepublican.40  Chief Justice White, speaking for the 
Court, regarded the company’s argument as 
based upon the single contention that the creation by a State of the 
power to legislate by the initiative and referendum [process] causes 
the prior lawful state government to be bereft of its lawful character 
as the result of the provisions of § 4 of Art. IV of the Constitution.41 
The Chief Justice concluded, however, that only the political branches 
could determine that a state’s government had become unrepublican, 
and that, until they did so, the courts could not “disregard the 
existence in fact of the State [and] of its recognition by all of the 
departments of the Federal Government.”42  He relied for that 
proposition on “the leading and absolutely controlling case,” Luther.43  
That case, he said, recognized the 
necessity for the existence somewhere in the Constitution of a 
tribunal, upon which the people of a State could rely, to protect 
them from the wrongful continuance against their will of a 
government not republican in form, proceeded to inquire whether 
a tribunal existed and its character.  In doing this it pointed out that 
owing to the inherent political character of such a question its 
decision was not by the Constitution vested in the judicial 
department of the Government, but was on the contrary exclusively 
committed to the legislative department by whose action on such 
subject the judiciary were absolutely controlled.44 
                                               
 39. Id. at 134.  Under the initiative process, “a stated number of voters were given 
the right at any time to secure a submission to popular vote for approval of any matter 
which it was desired to have enacted into law.”  Id. 
 40. See Transcript of Record at 8, Pac. States Tel., 223 U.S. 118 (No. 36) (relying on 
Article IV and several other provisions to maintain that the U.S. Constitution requires 
that “the government of the several states shall be representative in form and that the 
several states shall create and maintain representative legislative assemblies”).  The 
initiative process was a form of direct democracy because it empowered voters to create 
legislation by allowing them to submit laws to a popular vote rather than wait for their 
elected representatives to pass the desired law.  Id. at 137–41.  The Supreme Court of 
Oregon rejected the constitutional defense, and the company appealed to the 
Supreme Court of the United States on writ of error.  Pac. States Tel., 223 U.S. at 136. 
 41. Pac. States Tel., 223 U.S. at 137. 
 42. Id. at 142. 
 43. Id. at 143. 
 44. Id. at 146. 
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Having found that only Congress could determine that a state 
government is unrepublican, and that Congress had not done so, the 
Court dismissed the writ of error for want of jurisdiction.45 
Chief Justice White’s choice of words shows that he regarded the 
courts as conclusively bound by Congress’s decision to recognize the 
existing government of Oregon, with that decision’s implication that 
that government was republican.  He said that the judiciary was 
“absolutely controlled” by the legislative department, which he 
described as a “tribunal.”46  Three times in one paragraph the Chief 
Justice referred to recognition of a state by Congress.47  His Court had 
recently reaffirmed, and soon would reiterate, the principle that 
recognition of a government is a political decision that is binding on 
the courts.48  In the next paragraph, Chief Justice White asked whether 
the provisions of Article IV “authorize[d] the judiciary to substitute its 
judgment as to a matter purely political for the judgment of Congress 
on a subject committed to it.”49  Describing Congress’s action as a 
“judgment” indicated that it had acted like a court, applying legal 
principles to specific facts. 
                                               
 45. Id. at 151; see infra notes 190–94 and accompanying text (explaining the lack 
of jurisdiction was statutory, not constitutional). 
 46. Pac. States Tel., 223 U.S. at 146. 
 47. Id. at 141–42. 
 48. In Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), the Court was called on to 
decide whether the acts of General Hernandez, a military commander during a civil 
war in Venezuela, were those of the government of Venezuela or those of “banditti or 
mere mobs.”  Id. at 253.  The Court found: 
The acts complained of were the acts of a military commander representing 
the authority of the revolutionary party as a government, which afterwards 
succeeded and was recognized by the United States.  We think the Circuit 
Court of Appeals was justified in concluding “that the acts of the defendant 
were the acts of the government of Venezuela, and as such are not properly 
the subject of adjudication in the courts of another government.” 
Id. at 254.  A few years after Pacific States Telephone, in Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 
U.S. 297 (1918), the Court had before it a purported expropriation by a rebel 
government of Mexico, a government that was later recognized by the United States.  
Id. at 299–301.  The Court treated the expropriation as a sovereign act of Mexico. 
It has been specifically decided that “Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, 
of a territory is not a judicial, but is a political question, the determination of 
which by the legislative and executive departments of any government 
conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects 
of that government.  This principle has always been upheld by this court, and 
has been affirmed under a great variety of circumstances.” 
Id. at 302 (quoting Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890)). 
 49. Pac. States Tel., 223 U.S. at 142. 
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Pacific States Telephone was decided on grounds of non-judicial 
finality:  Congress’s recognition of a state government conclusively 
determines that the state’s government is republican in form.  The 
Court had said that in Luther.  Whether that statement was a holding is 
not clear, but if it was a dictum in the nineteenth century, the 
statement became a holding in the twentieth.50 
A binding determination by a political actor may resolve a case only 
in part.  Luther, for example, turned not only on the lawfulness of the 
Charter government, but also on its imposition of martial law.  Only once 
the Court had concluded that a lawful government had lawfully imposed 
martial law was it able to conclude that the defense of official privilege 
was available and give judgment for the defendant.51  When a court 
attributes finality to the legal judgment of a non-judicial actor, the court 
often goes on to decide the case on the merits, assuming that the non-
judicial decision was correct.  Luther rested on political branch finality 
concerning questions of sovereignty and relations among sovereigns. 
Recognition of foreign governments is one example of that category.  
As Justice Brennan pointed out in Baker, the courts often give final 
authority to political branch conclusions regarding another 
fundamental question of relations among sovereigns:  war and peace.52  
The courts regularly regard themselves as bound by political decisions 
concerning the existence and duration of hostilities and resolve the 
cases before them on the basis of those decisions. 
b.   The process of legal enactment 
Congress may pass statutes only through the process set out in 
Article I, Section 7.  The Constitution may be amended only through 
the process set out in Article V.  The Court has found non-judicial 
finality with respect to aspects of those enactment processes. 
 i.   Federal statutes 
When bills are submitted to the President for signature or veto, they 
bear the statement of the Speaker of the House and President (or 
President Pro Tempore) of the Senate that the House and Senate 
                                               
 50. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 224–25 (1962).  Whether the courts are absolutely 
bound by a political determination that an existing state government is unrepublican 
is not clear.  Baker says that Congress’s determination that a government is unrepublican 
is binding, id., but no such determination was before the Court in that case. 
 51. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 47–48 (1849). 
 52. Baker, 369 U.S. at 213–14. 
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passed the bill.53  Under the Supreme Court’s enrolled bill doctrine, 
courts take as conclusive the certification that a particular text was 
passed by the requisite majority in Congress.54 
In Field v. Clark,55 a taxpayer argued that a statute levying a tax was 
invalid because the text of the document signed by the President 
pursuant to congressional certification and promulgated by the 
Secretary of State pursuant to statute was not the text that had been 
agreed to by both houses of Congress.56  The taxpayer offered to prove 
that claim with citations to the Journals of the two houses, but the 
Court refused to look behind the certifications and attempt to correct 
them by examining the records of congressional proceedings.57  The 
certification by the Speaker and Vice President, Justice Harlan 
explained, “carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative 
and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, 
with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by 
Congress.”58  That assurance reflects Congress’s judgment in applying 
the legal rules found in Article I, Section 7 and the procedures of each 
house to the particular facts of the votes on specific bills.  Whether a 
purported vote in the House of Representatives constituted passage of 
a bill, and if so what the content of the bill was, are legal judgments.  
Although it is part of the legislative process, certification that a bill was 
adopted resembles adjudication in that it involves legal judgment but 
no policy choice.  The enrolled bill doctrine gives conclusive effect in 
court to that judgment. 
 ii.   Constitutional amendments 
Like Field and the enrolled bill doctrine, the Court’s leading case on 
the constitutional amendment process, Coleman v. Miller,59 also rests on 
non-judicial finality under the political question rubric.  In Coleman, a 
majority of Justices attributed some degree of finality to congressional 
decisions regarding the adoption of amendments, and derived from 
                                               
 53. 1 U.S.C. § 106a (2012). 
 54. Baker, 369 U.S. at 214 (characterizing this rule as part of the political question doctrine). 
 55. 143 U.S. 649 (1892). 
 56. Id. at 667–69. 
 57. Id. at 668–69, 671 (noting appellant’s argument that a section that both houses 
had agreed upon had been erroneously omitted from the certified bill and, although 
that section was inapplicable to Field, because of the error, the President never signed 
into law a bill that passed Congress, so no law was made). 
 58. Id. at 672. 
 59. 307 U.S. 433 (1939). 
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Congress’s decisional authority a limit on the remedies courts may 
afford.  A majority of the Court, however, did not agree on the extent 
of congressional authority, so there was no majority opinion 
concerning the political question doctrine.  None of the Justices who 
relied on a political question rationale thought the Court lacked 
jurisdiction because of the political question involved. 
The events leading to Coleman began in 1924, when Congress 
submitted to the state legislatures a proposed constitutional 
amendment that would give Congress “power to limit, regulate, and 
prohibit the labor of persons under eighteen years of age.”60  Unlike 
the then-recent Eighteenth Amendment, which imposed Prohibition, 
the Child Labor Amendment did not itself specify a time during which 
it had to be ratified to be effective.61  The amendment proved very 
controversial among the States and was not ratified in the 1920s.62  In 
that decade, a number of states ratified the Amendment, some voted 
on the Amendment but did not ratify it, and some affirmatively voted 
to reject the Amendment.63  Kansas was one of the latter.64 
In 1937, President Franklin Roosevelt urged ratification of the Child 
Labor Amendment.65  Later that year, the Kansas legislature once again 
deliberated on ratification.66  A resolution of ratification originated in 
the state Senate, in which the Lieutenant Governor cast a purported 
tie-breaking vote in favor of ratification.67  The Kansas House of 
Representatives then approved the resolution.68  At that point a 
number of state senators and representatives who had voted against 
                                               
 60. Id. at 435 n.1. 
 61. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 3 (repealed 1933) (providing that the 
Amendment would be inoperative if the states failed to ratify it within seven years of 
submission), with Child-Labor Amendment to the Constitution:  Hearing on S.J. Res. 224 Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 2 (1923) (providing that the Amendment 
would be valid “when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States”). 
 62. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 451 (explaining that states met the Amendment with 
adverse sentiment and that by the end of 1925, sixteen state legislatures had voted to 
reject ratification and four states supported ratification). 
 63. See DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS:  AMENDING THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION, 1776–1995 259–61 (1996) (tracking various states’ processes for 
ratification, rejection, and failure to vote from 1924 through 1929). 
 64. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 435 (citing Kansas’s rejection of the amendment in 1925). 
 65. On January 7, 1937, President Roosevelt wrote to a number of governors and 
governors-elect urging them to support ratification in their states.  FRANKLIN DELANO 
ROOSEVELT, THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 657–58 (1938). 
 66. Coleman v. Miller, 71 P.2d 518, 519 (Kan. 1937). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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ratification brought an action against Miller, the Secretary of the 
Kansas Senate, and other Kansas officials, in the Supreme Court of 
Kansas.69  The plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus directing Secretary 
Miller to erase the endorsement he had put on the resolution 
declaring it to have passed the Kansas Senate, and replace it with an 
endorsement reading, “was not passed.”70  They also sought orders 
against Miller and the other defendants restraining them from signing 
the resolution and presenting it to the Governor of Kansas.71 
On the merits, the plaintiffs argued that the Lieutenant Governor 
had no authority to cast a vote on a constitutional amendment, and 
that as a result the resolution had failed on an equally divided vote in 
the Kansas Senate.72  They also argued that Kansas’s earlier vote of 
rejection barred any further action by that state and that the 
amendment was no longer open to ratification because a reasonable 
time for ratification had passed.73  On the last point, the plaintiffs 
relied on statements by the Supreme Court of the United States in a 
case concerning the Eighteenth Amendment, where the Court held 
that Article V implicitly limits the amendment process to a reasonable 
time from proposal.74 
The Supreme Court of Kansas denied the requested relief and the 
Supreme Court of the United States affirmed.  The Kansas court 
considered and rejected the petitioners’ arguments concerning Article 
V.75  In the Supreme Court of the United States, Chief Justice Hughes 
                                               
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 527 (citing Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 374, 376 (1921)) (holding that 
Congress has the power to fix a definite period for the ratification of an amendment 
to the Constitution).  Dillon involved a challenge to the validity of the Eighteenth 
Amendment, Section 3 of which provided that the Amendment shall be inoperative if 
it has not been ratified within seven years of proposal.  256 U.S. at 370–71.  The 
opponents of the Amendment argued that Congress did not have the power to impose 
such a time limit.  Id. at 371.  The Court rejected that challenge, reasoning that the 
Constitution itself requires that amendments be ratified within a reasonable time.  Id. 
at 374.  Because the Constitution permits ratification only within a reasonable time, 
Congress could set such a time in the amendment itself.  Id. at 376. 
 75. In response to petitioners’ arguments, the Kansas Supreme Court concluded 
that the Lieutenant Governor of Kansas could cast a tie-breaking vote on a 
constitutional amendment, Coleman, 71 P.2d at 524, that a State may reject and then 
subsequently validly ratify a constitutional amendment, id. at 526, and that ratification 
of the Child Labor Amendment remained timely, id. at 526–27. 
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wrote an opinion styled as that of the Court that did not command a 
majority of the Justices on all the issues it addressed.  The Chief Justice 
dealt first with “the jurisdiction of this Court,” which had been 
challenged on the grounds that the Kansas legislators had “no standing 
to seek to have the judgment of the state court reviewed,” and that the 
writ of certiorari therefore should be dismissed.76  In a decision that 
remains important with respect to so-called “legislator standing,” the 
Court concluded that it had jurisdiction, even though the plaintiffs did 
not allege private damage.77  On that question the Chief Justice was 
joined by Justices Stone, Reed, Butler, and McReynolds, and so spoke 
for a majority of the Court.78 
A different majority concluded that the Supreme Court of Kansas 
was correct in denying relief.79  Seven Justices agreed on that 
disposition and characterized ratification of constitutional 
amendments as at least in part a political question for Congress to 
resolve.80  Those seven divided into blocs of three and four that 
differed in their reasoning, so there was no opinion for a majority on 
that issue.81  All seven understood the political question doctrine as 
producing a form of non-judicial finality. 
Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for himself and Justices Stone and 
Reed, found that Congress had the final authority to decide whether a 
constitutional amendment had been ratified in a timely fashion, and 
that the congressional decision would be conclusive for the courts.  He 
asserted that “[t]he decision by the Congress, in its control of the 
action of the Secretary of State, of the question whether the 
amendment had been adopted within a reasonable time would not be 
                                               
 76. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 437 (1939). 
 77. Id. at 445 (discussing the argument that the plaintiffs lacked standing, as the 
legislators bringing suit could not show an individual and particularized injury). 
 78. Justice Frankfurter, in an opinion joined by Justices Roberts, Black, and 
Douglas, maintained that the petitioners lacked standing.  Id. at 460. 
 79. The Court did not address the objection to the Lieutenant Governor’s tie-
breaking vote, being evenly divided as to whether that was a nonjusticiable political 
question.  Id. at 446–47. 
 80. Id. at 435, 456–57.  Justices Hughes, Stone, and Reed for the Court and Justices 
Black, Roberts, Frankfurter, and Douglas in concurrence.  Id. at 435, 456. 
 81. Id. at 451–52, 459–60.  Justices Hughes, Stone, and Reed addressed the 
question regarding limits of Congress’s power to determine what constitutes a 
reasonable timeframe for ratification, ultimately finding that the proper frame was for 
Congress alone to determine; Justices Black, Roberts, Frankfurter, and Douglas found 
it improper for the Court to even address the question of reasonableness as the rules 
of ratification are the exclusive domain of Congress and require no pronouncements 
of validity by the court.  Id. 
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subject to review by the courts.”82  Describing his Court’s prior 
decisions “as to the class of questions deemed to be political and not 
justiciable,” he then explained that “[i]n determining whether a 
question falls within that category, the appropriateness under our 
system of government of attributing finality to the action of the 
political departments and also the lack of satisfactory criteria for a 
judicial determination are dominant considerations.”83 
The Chief Justice was quite explicit in saying that political actors’ 
resolution of political questions can provide the courts with rules of 
decision that they then can apply.  Less explicit was his derivation of 
the result in Coleman from that principle.  He rejected a challenge to 
his Court’s jurisdiction and affirmed the Supreme Court of Kansas’s 
decision to deny relief, but he did not address the substance of 
petitioners’ arguments under Article V.  How could Chief Justice 
Hughes have thought it proper to exercise jurisdiction and affirm 
without fully resolving the merits? 
Although the Chief Justice did not explain that point in depth, his 
opinion indicates that affirmance was appropriate because judgment 
for the plaintiffs would have interfered with Congress’s decisional 
process.  In the Kansas court, the plaintiffs had sought orders that 
would prevent the transmission to the national government of a 
certification that Kansas had ratified.  Judicial relief of that kind would 
have intercepted Kansas’s certification, and kept Congress from 
passing on its validity.  Chief Justice Hughes believed that Congress was 
to decide on the validity of that purported act.  After explaining that 
the reasonableness of time for ratification presents political and not 
judicial questions, he said that “[t]hey can be decided by the Congress 
with the full knowledge and appreciation . . . of the political, social[,] 
and economic conditions which have prevailed during the period 
                                               
 82. Id. at 454.  In referring to Congress’s control of the action of the Secretary of 
State, the Chief Justice apparently had the circumstances surrounding the 
promulgation of the Fourteenth Amendment in mind.  In response to the Secretary 
of State’s doubts as to whether the Amendment had been ratified, Congress in 1868 
declared that it had been ratified and directed the Secretary to promulgate it.  Id. at 
448–49.  According to Chief Justice Hughes, “This decision by the political 
departments of the Government as to the validity of the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment has been accepted.”  Id. at 449–50.  Of all the amendments to the 
Constitution, only the Fourteenth was promulgated in response to specific 
congressional direction.  Chief Justice Hughes did not base his argument about 
congressional power on the text of Article V, which makes no reference to any 
congressional role in promulgation. 
 83. Id. at 454–55. 
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since the submission of the amendment.”84  The question of reasonable 
time would be “an open one for the consideration of the Congress 
when, in the presence of certified ratifications by three-fourths of the 
States, the time arrives for the promulgation of the adoption of the 
amendment.”85  That time can arrive only if certifications of ratification 
are before Congress, which they will not be if the relevant state officers 
are blocked from submitting them by court order. 
In the opinion’s penultimate paragraph, the Chief Justice repeated 
that Congress “has the final determination of the question” regarding 
lapse of time, and that therefore “[t]he state officials should not be 
restrained from certifying to the Secretary of State the adoption by the 
legislature of Kansas of the resolution of ratification.”86  A judicial 
order restraining certification would keep Congress from resolving the 
question, while denial of relief would give the national legislature an 
opportunity to make a final determination.  The implication is that 
when the final decision is for Congress to make, the courts should not 
give remedies that keep from the legislature the official records that it 
needs to perform its quasi-judicial function. 
Justice Black, speaking for himself and Justices Roberts, Frankfurter, 
and Douglas, was equally clear that the political question doctrine gave 
Congress authority conclusively to resolve a contested question of law 
and fact.  Ratification of constitutional amendments is a political 
question, and “decision of a ‘political question’ by the ‘political 
department’ to which the Constitution has committed it ‘conclusively 
binds the judges, as well as other officials, citizens[,] and subjects of . . . 
government.’”87  Proclamation of an amendment under the authority 
of Congress “will carry with it a solemn assurance by the Congress that 
ratification has taken place as the Constitution commands,” and when 
that assurance is given, “a proclaimed amendment must be accepted 
as part of the Constitution, leaving to the judiciary its traditional 
authority of interpretation.”88  That is non-judicial finality. 
                                               
 84. Id. at 454. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 456. 
 87. Id. at 457 (Black, J., concurring) (quoting Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 
212 (1890)). 
 88. Id. at 457–58.  Like the Chief Justice, Justice Black did not explain how 
promulgation by the Secretary of State pursuant to a general statutory directive to 
promulgate validly ratified amendments could constitute a determination or assurance 
by Congress that any particular amendment had been ratified. 
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Justice Black declined to join the Chief Justice’s reasoning, because 
Chief Justice Hughes’s understanding of congressional finality was too 
limited for him.  Justice Black thought that the Chief Justice 
understated “Congress[‘s] . . . sole and complete control over the 
amending process, subject to no judicial review.”89  Although he 
treated ratification as a political question, the Chief Justice had cited 
the Court’s earlier statement that amendments must be ratified within 
a reasonable time.90  In Justice Black’s view, the Court should have said 
nothing about the rules governing ratification, other than to 
disapprove its earlier statements on the subject, because “Congress . . . 
cannot be bound by and is under no duty to accept the 
pronouncements upon [its] exclusive power by this Court or the 
Kansas courts,” and any judicial discussion of the topic “is a mere 
admonition to the Congress in the nature of an advisory opinion.”91 
Like Chief Justice Hughes, Justice Black thought that congressional 
finality on political question grounds meant that the Supreme Court 
of Kansas had been right to withhold relief.  Justice Black did not 
propose to vacate the Kansas court’s judgment or reverse with 
instructions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction.92  He said that 
judicial review of or pronouncements upon a supposed limitation of 
a “reasonable time” within which Congress may accept 
ratification . . . and kindred questions, are all consistent only with an 
ultimate control over the amending process in the courts.  And this 
must inevitably embarrass the course of amendment by subjecting to 
judicial interference matters that we believe were intrusted by the 
Constitution solely to the political branch of government.93 
Justice Black’s reference to judicial control and interference, in 
addition to judicial pronouncements, indicates that a decree that 
would prevent a certification from reaching Congress was as 
impermissible as any judicial statements about Article V.  A decree like 
the mandamus that Coleman requested from the Kansas court would 
interfere with congressional decision making by limiting the official 
records on which Congress could base its decision.  But according to 
Justice Black, “[t]he [amendment] process itself is ‘political’ in its 
                                               
 89. Id. at 459. 
 90. Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 375 (1921). 
 91. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 459–60 (Black, J., concurring). 
 92. Id. at 469–70 (writing that he would have dismissed the writ for want of jurisdiction 
in the Supreme Court of the United States, but not indicating that the restrictions on his 
Court’s authority translated to a similar want of jurisdiction in the Kansas court). 
 93. Id. at 458. 
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entirety, from submission until an amendment becomes part of the 
Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control[,] or 
interference at any point.”94  In his view, that was why the Supreme 
Court of Kansas was right to deny mandamus, though he believed it 
was wrong to have discussed the substance of Article V in its reasoning. 
Coleman thus turned on non-judicial finality.  It differed from Luther 
and Field v. Clark because the relevant political actor had not yet 
supplied the courts with a decision that they could treat as conclusive.  
The Court was not being asked to respect a congressional action 
promulgating the Child Labor Amendment.  Nor was Coleman a case 
in which a court could make a provisional decision subject to later 
correction by a conclusive political act.  Had the courts granted the 
relief requested, the federal government would not have received 
notification from Kansas that the state had ratified.  If thirty-five other 
states had notified the Secretary of State of their ratification, but 
Kansas had not done so, Congress would not have been in a position 
to decide if Kansas had validly ratified and if the amendment had 
therefore become part of the Constitution.95  That feature of the case, 
combined with all seven Justices’ concern that the courts not interfere 
with congressional resolution of the timeliness issue, suggest that seven 
Justices concluded that the courts may not prejudice political 
resolution of a political question by issuing an order that affects the 
process through which that resolution takes place. 
This aspect of the political question doctrine, like the aspect 
concerning recognition of sovereign relations, accords conclusive 
force to non-judicial decisions that apply legal rules to specific facts. 
b. Congressional adjudicative authority 
Some provisions of the Constitution assign adjudicative authority to 
a house of Congress.  Article II, Section 4 provides that “[t]he 
President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States shall 
be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, 
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”96  Article 
I, Section 2 gives “the sole Power of Impeachment” to the House,97 and 
Section 3 provides that “the Senate shall have the sole Power to try all 
                                               
 94. Id. at 459. 
 95. At the time of Coleman, ratification required thirty-six of the forty-eight States 
then in the Union. 
 96. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 97. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. 
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Impeachments.”98  Section 5 of Article I states that each house of 
Congress “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and 
Qualifications of its own Members.”99 
In the exercise of those functions, the House and Senate apply law 
to fact to resolve legal disputes.  They perform functions more usually 
performed by courts, and the Constitution uses “judge” and “try” to 
describe those functions.  Under the rubric of the political question 
doctrine, the Supreme Court gives substantial finality to congressional 
decisions pursuant to these powers.  With respect to contested 
elections for the House and Senate, the Court’s position is that the 
relevant political decision maker’s judgment is absolutely final. 
Roudebush v. Hartke100 involved the extremely close 1970 election for 
Senate in Indiana.  Incumbent Senator Vance Hartke was certified the 
winner by a narrow margin, and his opponent, Richard Roudebush, 
sought a recount under Indiana law.101  Hartke then sought an 
injunction against the recount in federal district court, arguing that it 
was unlawful because of the Senate’s power to judge elections, returns, 
and qualifications of its members.102  While that litigation was in 
progress, the Senate seated Hartke, doing so explicitly without 
prejudice to the recount and the related litigation.103 
The Supreme Court concluded that Indiana’s recount procedure 
was lawful, as it was part of the state election process that would 
ultimately be reviewed by the Senate.104  The result of that review would 
be conclusive.  “Which candidate is entitled to be seated in the Senate 
is, to be sure, a nonjusticiable political question.”105  The Indiana 
recount process, including its judicial component, could go forward 
because it was in service of, and not prejudicial to, the Senate’s action 
as judge of the election.  “Once this case is resolved and the Senate is 
assured that it has received the final Indiana tally, the Senate will be 
                                               
 98. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
 99. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. 
 100. 405 U.S. 15 (1972). 
 101. Id. at 16–17. 
 102. Id. at 17 (claiming that the recount was prohibited under Article 1, Section 5 
of the U.S. Constitution); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
 103. Id. at 18. 
 104. “A recount does not prevent the Senate from independently evaluating the 
election any more than the initial count does.  The Senate is free to accept or reject 
the apparent winner in either count, and, if it chooses, to conduct its own recount.”  
Id. at 25–26 (footnotes omitted). 
 105. Id. at 19. 
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free to make an unconditional and final judgment under Art. I, § 5.”106  
Final judgments are made by institutions that conclusively apply law to 
fact.  In Roudebush, that institution was the Senate. 
The question of congressional finality arose a few years earlier in 
Powell v. McCormack,107 which involved the qualifications of U.S. 
Representatives.  Adam Clayton Powell, elected to the House from New 
York, sought a declaration that his exclusion from the 90th Congress 
had been unlawful.108  The Court concluded that the district court had 
subject matter jurisdiction under Article III and the statutes.109  It then 
turned to justiciability, which it explicitly distinguished from subject 
matter jurisdiction, and to the political question doctrine as an aspect 
of justiciability.110  The Court addressed the Respondents’ argument 
that “this case presents a political question because, under Art. I, § 5, 
there has been a ‘textually demonstrable constitutional commitment’ 
to the House of the ‘adjudicatory power’ to determine Powell’s 
qualifications.”111 
The Court understood that question as turning on the House’s final 
decisional authority.  If Article I, Section 5 “gives the House judicially 
unreviewable power to set qualifications for membership and to judge 
whether prospective members meet those qualifications, further 
review of the House determination might well be barred by the 
political question doctrine.”112  But “if the Constitution gives the House 
power to judge only whether elected members possess the three 
standing qualifications set forth in the Constitution, further 
consideration would be necessary to determine whether any of the 
other formulations of the political question doctrine” the Court had 
                                               
 106. Id. 
 107. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
 108. Powell was excluded as a result of an investigation into alleged irregularities in 
his official expenses.  Id. at 489–93.  By the time the Court decided Powell v. McCormack, 
he had already been seated for the 91st Congress and had been fined for financial 
misconduct.  Id. at 494–95.  The Court concluded that the case was not moot, because 
a declaration could still bear on his claim for pay from the 90th Congress, id. at 495–
500, and that it was not barred by the Speech or Debate Clause because Powell properly 
sought relief from officers of the House who were not Representatives themselves.  Id. 
at 505–06. 
 109. Id. at 512. 
 110. Id. (“As we pointed out in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962), there is a 
significant difference between determining whether a federal court has ‘jurisdiction 
of the subject matter’ and determining whether a cause over which a court has subject 
matter jurisdiction is ‘justiciable.’”). 
 111. Id. at 519. 
 112. Id. at 520. 
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previously identified applied to the case.113  After an extensive review 
of the history, the Court concluded that neither House has authority 
to impose qualifications beyond those set out in the Constitution, 
reasoning that “Art. I, § 5, is at most a ‘textually demonstrable 
commitment’ to Congress to judge only the qualifications expressly set 
forth in the Constitution.  Therefore, the ‘textual commitment’ 
formulation of the political question doctrine does not bar federal 
courts from adjudicating petitioners’ claims.”114  In assessing the two 
houses’ function as “judge” of elections and qualifications, the Court 
found that their decisions were final only to a limited extent.115 
Perhaps the clearest example of non-judicial adjudication in the 
Constitution is the Senate’s sole power to try all impeachments.  The 
meaning of that provision, and the location of the power to interpret 
and apply it, came before the Court in Nixon v. United States.116  Walter 
Nixon, a U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Mississippi, was 
impeached by the House of Representatives.117  In his impeachment 
trial, the Senate took testimony before a committee rather than in a 
session of the Senate as a whole.118  The record created before the 
committee was then available to each Senator, and a session of the full 
Senate was held at which the House impeachment managers and Judge 
Nixon’s counsel presented argument and Judge Nixon addressed the 
Senate.119  Nixon objected to the Senate’s procedure and after his 
conviction and removal brought suit in federal district court, seeking 
a declaration that his removal was void and that he was entitled to 
reinstatement as a federal judge and back pay.120  The district court 
dismissed his claim as nonjusticiable, the court of appeals affirmed the 
district court, and the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals.121 
Nixon v. United States holds that the Senate’s decisions on 
impeachment are substantially final on political question grounds, 
though the exact scope of the finality the Court attributed to the 
                                               
 113. Id. at 520–21 (footnotes omitted). 
 114. Id. at 548.  After resolving that primary question, the Court dealt briefly with 
other considerations, including the elements of political question cases that had been 
listed in Baker.  Id. at 548–49. 
 115. Id. at 550. 
 116. 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
 117. Id. at 226–27. 
 118. Id. at 227 & n.1. 
 119. Id. at 227–28. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See id. at 228, 238.  The District Court concluded that the claim was 
nonjusticiable and the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court affirmed.  Id. 
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Senate is not entirely clear.  The Court may have held that a Senate 
judgment of conviction is absolutely final and subject to no 
reconsideration by the courts.  It is also possible that, like Powell, Nixon 
v. United States recognized a narrower form of finality as to an issue, not 
the result and everything that went into it.  The specific issue was 
whether the procedures the Senate used qualified as a trial under 
Article I, Section 5. 
Elements of the Court’s reasoning point to the broad rationale.  
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, noted that the House 
has the “sole” power of impeachment and the Senate the “sole” power 
to try all impeachments.122  In his view, “the word ‘sole’ indicates that 
this authority is reposed in the Senate and nowhere else.”123  That 
means that “the Senate alone shall have authority to determine 
whether an individual should be acquitted or convicted.”124  The Chief 
Justice then considered the Federal Convention’s decision to move 
impeachment trials from the Supreme Court to the Senate.125  He 
explained that “the Judiciary, and the Supreme Court in particular, 
were not chosen to have any role in impeachments.”126  A decision to 
exclude the courts completely would not be confined to keeping them 
from deciding whether the Senate had truly tried an impeachment.  
That line of reasoning suggests that Senate judgments of conviction 
are absolutely final, and that the courts may not independently decide 
any question on which such a judgment rests. 
On the other hand, the Court also pointed out that “the use of the 
word ‘try’ in the first sentence of the Impeachment Trial Clause lacks 
sufficient precision to afford any judicially manageable standard of 
review of the Senate’s actions.”127  The breadth of that term is relevant 
specifically with respect to judicial determination whether there has 
been a trial, not with respect to other issues that might come up 
concerning impeachment.  Moreover, the Court said that the question 
was whether the Constitution contained a textually demonstrable 
commitment of “the issue” to a political actor.128  That may have been 
an accident of phrasing, or it may have represented the Court’s 
                                               
 122. Id. at 230–31. 
 123. Id. at 229. 
 124. Id. at 231. 
 125. Id. at 233–35. 
 126. Id. at 234. 
 127. Id. at 230. 
 128. Id. at 228, 230. 
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understanding that a commitment of only one issue—what constitutes 
an impeachment—was at stake. 
Nixon v. United States found substantial non-judicial finality under the 
political question rubric.  Most likely the case means that Senate 
impeachments are absolutely conclusive as far as the courts are 
concerned, but the opinion can be read more narrowly.  Each of the 
three leading cases in which the Court has relied on the political 
question doctrine—Luther, Coleman, and Nixon v. United States—rests 
on non-judicial finality.  In all three, the Court found that the judiciary 
was absolutely bound by a political actor’s decision that applied legal 
rules to specific facts. 
2.   Remedies that would direct political discretion 
John Marshall said that “[q]uestions, in their nature political, or 
which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can 
never be made in this [C]ourt.”129  That conclusion followed from the 
principle that “[t]he province of the court is, solely, to decide on the 
rights of individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive 
officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion.”130  That 
principle would not keep the court from issuing a writ of mandamus 
ordering that Madison deliver Marbury’s commission, Marshall explained, 
because while mandamus is confined to requiring the performance of 
non-discretionary, ministerial duties, delivering the commission would 
involve no exercise of discretion by an executive officer.131 
Contemporary political question doctrine incorporates the principle 
that courts may not grant remedies that would control non-judicial 
decisions to an impermissible extent.  The Supreme Court applied that 
principle in Gilligan v. Morgan,132 an injunctive proceeding against the 
Governor of Ohio that grew out of the deaths at Kent State University.  
According to the plaintiffs, the confrontation between demonstrators 
and the Ohio National Guard had led to fatalities because the Guard 
was ill-trained and improperly equipped to deal with civil disturbances.133  
The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted.134  The court of appeals reversed in part and 
                                               
 129. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 171–73. 
 132. 413 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 133. Morgan v. Rhodes, 456 F.2d 608, 611 (6th Cir. 1972), rev’d sub nom. Gilligan v. 
Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (quoting the facts of the case as they appear in the complaint). 
 134. Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 3. 
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remanded, instructing the district court to determine whether the 
Ohio National Guard’s “pattern of training, weaponry and orders” 
made the use of lethal force inevitable in circumstances in which that level 
of force was not reasonably necessary.135  In dissent, Judge Celebrezze 
argued that there was “no conceivable relief” the district court could 
grant because “any such relief would present a nonjusticiable political 
question.”136  The court of appeals majority responded that if called on 
to award injunctive relief, the district court “will find much material 
available for devising a suitable remedy”; for example, as in the report 
of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders.137 
The Supreme Court reversed.138  Chief Justice Burger, writing for the 
Court, began by stressing that military decisions are not per se exempt 
from judicial examination.139  Gilligan was not a damages action 
growing out of the Kent State tragedy, nor one “seeking a restraining 
order against some specified and imminently threatened unlawful 
action.”140  It was “a broad call on judicial power to assume continuing 
regulatory jurisdiction over the activities of the Ohio National 
Guard.”141  The plaintiffs wanted the district court to “establish 
standards for the training, kind of weapons and scope and kind of 
orders to control the actions of the National Guard,” and then to 
“exercise a continuing judicial surveillance over the Guard to assure 
compliance” with its order.142  In the Supreme Court’s view, such an 
order would exert too much judicial control over government actions 
that the Constitution leaves to the electorally accountable branches.143  
Courts are not suited either to make military decisions or to supervise 
them.  “The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the 
composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are 
essentially professional military judgments, subject always to civilian 
control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.”144 
Having found that formulating riot-control policy would require 
judicial resolution of nonjusticiable political questions, the Court 
                                               
 135. Morgan, 456 F.2d at 612. 
 136. Id. at 618 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting). 
 137. Id. at 614. 
 138. Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 12. 
 139. Id. at 11–12. 
 140. Id. at 5. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 6. 
 143. Id. at 10. 
 144. Id. 
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reiterated that military decisions could under other circumstances be 
tested by courts for their legality.  “[W]e neither hold nor imply that 
the conduct of the National Guard is always beyond judicial review or 
that there may not be accountability in a judicial forum for violations 
of law or for specific unlawful conduct by military personnel, whether 
by way of damages or injunctive relief.”145  Extensive judicial control of 
military policy was not permissible, but military decisions were still 
subject to the law. 
The Court promptly kept its implicit promise in Scheuer v. Rhodes,146 
a damages action for wrongful death arising from the events at Kent 
State.  The plaintiffs sought recovery from the personal funds of 
Governor Rhodes and other Ohio civilian and military officials.147  The 
Supreme Court concluded that the defendants did not enjoy sovereign 
immunity.148  They had only the qualified immunity that protects 
officials when their acts are not clearly unlawful.149  Qualified immunity 
would enable decision makers to “act swiftly and firmly”150 while 
preserving the possibility of “accountability in a judicial forum for 
violations of law or for specific unlawful conduct by military personnel, 
whether by way of damages or injunctive relief.”151 
Taken together, Gilligan and Scheuer show that the branch of the 
political question doctrine at work in the former case forbids judicial 
displacement of discretion, not the application of legal standards to 
military decisions.  The remedy at issue in Gilligan was a classic 
prophylactic injunction.152  Plaintiffs asked the district court to impose 
on the Ohio National Guard detailed rules that were not legally 
required, but that were designed to reduce the likelihood of events like 
those at Kent State.  Such an order would constrain the policy 
discretion of another government actor to take otherwise-lawful 
measures.  Gilligan stands for the proposition that when the decisions 
                                               
 145. Id. at 11–12 (footnote omitted). 
 146. 416 U.S. 232 (1974), abrogated on other grounds by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800, 814–15 (1982). 
 147. Id. at 234. 
 148. Id. at 237–39 (noting that sovereign immunity protects the government itself, 
not government officials against whom recovery is sought from their personal funds). 
 149. Id. at 247–48. 
 150. Id. at 246. 
 151. Id. at 249 (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1973)). 
 152. See generally ELAINE W. SHOBEN ET AL., REMEDIES:  CASES AND PROBLEMS 293 (4th 
ed. 2007) (defining a prophylactic injunction as a method “to safeguard the plaintiff’s 
rights by directing the defendant’s behavior so as to minimize the chance that wrongs 
might recur in the future”). 
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involved are about military discretion, the separation of judicial and 
executive power imposes limits on the courts’ remedial authority.153 
A leading nineteenth century political question case also falls into 
this category.  Mississippi v. Johnson154 invokes Marbury and the 
distinction between discretionary and ministerial functions in rejecting 
a suit against the Executive.  Under the Reconstruction Acts of 1867, 
Congress placed the then-existing governments of the former 
Confederate states under military supervision, and provided for the 
establishment of new governments created through acts of popular 
sovereignty administered by the U.S. Army.155  Mississippi asked the 
Supreme Court for leave to file a bill in equity against President 
Andrew Johnson in the Court’s state-citizen diversity original 
jurisdiction (Johnson was sued as a citizen of Tennessee).156  The Court 
rejected the bill on the grounds that the injunction it sought would 
subject presidential actions in “exercise of the power to see that the 
laws are faithfully executed to judicial control.”157  Actions of that kind 
were “in no just sense ministerial” but “purely executive and 
political.”158  Marbury, the Court explained, was not to the contrary, 
because it involved a ministerial duty, “a simple, definite duty, arising 
under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and imposed by law.”159 
Today, the Court apparently regards Mississippi v. Johnson as limiting 
judicial decrees directed to the President himself.160  As Gilligan shows, 
                                               
 153. The Court in Baker stressed that all of its earlier political question cases had 
involved the national separation of powers, not the relations between state and national 
governments.  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).  A few years later it decided Gilligan, 
in which the defendant was the Governor of Ohio, on political question grounds.  Gilligan, 
413 U.S. at 12.  The doctrine thus to some extent operates to protect decisions by state, 
and not just federal, political actors.  The Court has not had occasion to decide 
whether a state political decision can give rise to non-judicial finality of the kind 
attributed to the federal political branches in cases like Luther and Coleman.  Nor has it 
been called on to decide whether state courts may exert the kind of control over state 
political actors that may not be exerted over the federal political branches. 
 154. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867). 
 155. Id. at 475–77. 
 156. Id. at 475. 
 157. Id. at 499. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 498. 
 160.  
While injunctive relief against executive officials like the Secretary of 
Commerce is within the courts’ power . . . the District Court’s grant of 
injunctive relief against the President himself is extraordinary, and should 
have raised judicial eyebrows.  We have left open the question whether the 
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however, the Court has not abandoned the principle that there are 
limits to judicial control of executive discretion, and it still uses the 
distinction between judicial and political power in referring to those limits.  
A branch of the political question doctrine enforces that distinction.161 
B.   Jurisdiction, Justiciability, and Decision on the Merits 
Today’s Court has indicated in dicta that the political question 
doctrine limits the power of Article III courts to decide certain cases.162  
                                               
President might be subject to a judicial injunction requiring the performance 
of a purely “ministerial” duty . . . and we have held that the President may be 
subject to a subpoena to provide information relevant to an ongoing criminal 
prosecution . . . but in general “this court has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin 
the President in the performance of his official duties.” 
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 802–03 (1992) (internal citations omitted) 
(quoting Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 501). 
 161. Speaking for a plurality of the Court in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) 
(plurality opinion), Justice Frankfurter concluded that a challenge to alleged 
malapportionment of congressional districts should be dismissed for want of equity.  
Id. at 556.  In Justice Frankfurter’s view, the complaint asked “of this Court what is 
beyond its competence to grant” because it called on the judiciary “to reconstruct the 
electoral process of Illinois.”  Id. at 552.  “Of course no court can affirmatively re-map 
the Illinois districts so as to bring them more in conformity with the standards of 
fairness for a representative system.”  Id. at 553.  Congress, by contrast, could deal with 
the problem if there was one.  Id. at 554.  Justice Frankfurter relied on limits on the 
federal courts’ remedial authority and cited Mississippi v. Johnson.  Id. at 556.  Justice 
Frankfurter’s opinion in Colegrove fits in the line of decisions that include Mississippi v. 
Johnson and Gilligan. 
 162. In Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), the Court explained that it is 
“familiar learning that no justiciable ‘controversy’ exists when parties seek adjudication of 
a political question.”  Id. at 516 (citing Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849)).  As 
in Luther, the Court decided Massachusetts v. EPA on the merits.  549 U.S. at 527.  In 
describing the lower court’s decision in Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012), the 
Court rejected the court of appeals’s holding that “the courts lacked authority to 
decide the case because it presented a political question,” id. at 191, but apparently 
not the premise that if the case did present a political question the courts could not 
decide it.  Having concluded that the case presented no political question, the Court 
remanded so that the court of appeals could decide the merits.  Id. at 202. 
  Justice Scalia recently characterized the political question rationale of Coleman 
as “a rejection of jurisdiction” and cited Zivotofsky, a case decided more than eighty 
years after Coleman, for that characterization of the political question doctrine.  Ariz. 
State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2696–97 (2015) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  Because he assumed that the political question doctrine is a 
limit on jurisdiction, Justice Scalia regarded the Court’s resolution of the standing 
question in Coleman as “quite superfluous and arguably nothing but dictum.”  Id. at 
2697.  The Court in Coleman explicitly rejected a challenge to its jurisdiction based on 
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The Court has never held that there is such a limitation, however.  This 
Section shows that the Supreme Court’s cases that apply the political 
question doctrine do not regard it as a limit on the jurisdiction of 
Article III courts.  It discusses the cases in which the Court has relied 
on the doctrine, and then turns to Baker v. Carr, which, like earlier 
decisions, treated the doctrine as a source of non-judicial finality, not 
lack of jurisdiction. 
1.   The Court’s political question decisions 
Despite the political question doctrine’s close relation to the limits 
on federal judicial power, it is not a limit on subject matter jurisdiction 
as the Court uses that concept.  The political question doctrine has 
figured in the decision of cases in three ways, none of which involves a 
lack of jurisdiction under Article III.  First, the political question 
doctrine may require that a court decide on the merits, accepting an 
earlier political decision.  Second, it may bar a court from granting 
relief that would improperly interfere with a political decision.  Third, 
in applying it, a state court may be so clearly correct that its decision 
presents no substantial federal question in the statutory appellate 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States.  After 
describing the three contexts, this Section will undertake to better 
understand the concept of justiciability, which the Court has not fully 
elaborated. 
a. Decision on the merits based on a political actor’s legal judgment 
Perhaps the most straightforward application of the political 
question doctrine appeared in Luther.163  The Supreme Court accepted 
the political branches’ judgment that the established government was 
legitimate, and used it to assess Luther’s claim for damages, which was 
rejected on the merits.  The Court affirmed the circuit court’s 
judgment, and did not reverse with instructions to dismiss for want of 
jurisdiction.  Field v. Clark worked the same way.  Having concluded 
that the text of an Act certified by Congress was authoritative, the 
Court decided the case before it on that basis.164  Field no more involved 
a lack of jurisdiction than does a case that turns in part on the 
                                               
standing and then affirmed the Supreme Court of Kansas, which had decided the case 
on the merits.  Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 437–38 (1939). 
 163. See supra notes 8–37 and accompanying text. 
 164. See supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text. 
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preclusive effect of a prior judgment.  Non-judicial finality often 
operates in the same fashion as judicial finality. 
Because of the political question doctrine, the decision of a non-
judicial actor can provide a premise that the court uses in a decision 
on the merits.  As a result, the doctrine can support a decision in favor 
of the plaintiff, which a limit on jurisdiction cannot do.  In the 
nineteenth century recognition case Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Co.,165 
the defendant insurance company refused to pay when the insured’s 
vessel was seized by the government of Buenos Ayres (as Argentina was 
then known).166  That seizure followed a warning by Argentine officials 
that the Falkland Islands were Argentine territory, not open to 
American fishing vessels.167  The insurance company argued that the 
policy did not cover seizure under those circumstances.  The insured 
responded that the master of its vessel had acted reasonably in 
response to the Argentine threat by asserting the right of American 
citizens to operate in the Falklands, which the U.S. Executive did not 
recognize as part of Argentina.168  The Court found that the Executive’s 
conclusion regarding sovereignty over the Falklands was conclusive, 
and that in light of that conclusion the master had acted reasonably.169  
The plaintiff prevailed, relying in part on the Executive’s conclusive 
determination of sovereign rights.  As that case shows, deference to the 
legal decision of a political actor does not deprive a court of jurisdiction. 
b. Political autonomy and unavailability of relief 
In other situations, the political question doctrine prevents the court 
from granting relief.  In those cases, the doctrine bars relief whether 
or not the defendant’s conduct is lawful and so limits the issues the 
court addresses.  The doctrine does not, however, operate as a limitation 
on subject matter jurisdiction under Article III.  When it produces that 
result, the political question doctrine functions much like a limit on 
                                               
 165. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415 (1839). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 417. 
 168. Id. at 420. 
 169.  
And we think in the present case, as the executive, in his message, and in his 
correspondence with the government of Buenos Ayres, has denied the 
jurisdiction which it has assumed to exercise over the Falkland [I]slands; the 
fact must be taken and acted on by this Court as thus asserted and maintained. 
Id. at 420.  With that premise in place, the Court concluded that the master of the 
vessel took no risk that would relieve the insurers of liability on the policy.  Id. at 421. 
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equitable relief, such as the requirement that the remedy at law be 
inadequate.  If a court applying traditional rules about equitable relief 
concludes that the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, it will deny 
equitable relief without deciding whether the defendant is a 
wrongdoer and will be exercising its jurisdiction in doing so.170 
Either branch of the doctrine can require a court to deny a remedy 
without an inquiry into the lawfulness of the defendant’s conduct.  
Coleman shows how non-judicial finality can require that a court 
withhold relief.  The seven Justices who decided the case on political 
question grounds did so because judicial relief that prevented Kansas 
from reporting its purported ratification would interfere with a 
congressional decision that, if made, would be conclusive on the 
courts.  The other branch of the doctrine, found in Gilligan, readily 
falls into this category because it is formulated as a limit on relief.  As 
Scheuer demonstrated, the Court in Gilligan was concerned with 
decrees that would intrude into military discretion, not damages 
judgments based only on whether a use of force was lawful.  In Gilligan, 
the Court was able to decide that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the 
relief they requested without deciding all of the issues they raised.  
Because the injunction that the plaintiffs asked for could not be 
granted, the courts did not have to assess the Ohio National Guard’s 
propensity to use force unlawfully. 
In both Coleman and Gilligan, the Court exercised jurisdiction, and 
denied relief without resolving all the questions the plaintiffs raised.171  
When the political question doctrine makes relief unavailable on the 
facts as pled by the plaintiff, the complaint will be subject to dismissal 
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.172  When 
applicable legal principles require that the plaintiff be denied a 
favorable decree, the plaintiff has not stated a claim on which relief 
can be granted.  That conclusion can follow from principles governing 
remedies, just as it can follow from principles governing other 
                                               
 170. See infra note 184 and accompanying text. 
 171. In Coleman the Supreme Court of Kansas had resolved the issues the plaintiffs 
raised under Article V, but the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed that 
judgment on a different ground, relying on the political question doctrine to do so.  
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 437–38 (1939). 
 172. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (allowing dismissal for “failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted”). 
2017] THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINES 489 
 
components of the plaintiff’s claim for relief, including the substance 
of the dispute between the parties.173 
Gilligan illustrates the point that cases like it are properly dismissed 
under Rule 12(b)(6), not for want of jurisdiction.  The district court 
had dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.174  The court of appeals reversed that judgment in part, and 
the Supreme Court in turn reversed the court of appeals.175  The Court 
thereby reinstated a dismissal based not a lack of jurisdiction, but on 
the legal principles governing the parties’ dispute.  The Court 
understood the question to involve the availability of relief, not the 
courts’ jurisdiction.  It began its inquiry into justiciability by asking, if 
the facts alleged by the plaintiffs were true, “whether there is any relief 
a District Court could appropriately fashion.”176  Having answered that 
question in the negative, because the decree contemplated would 
require that a court make military judgments, the Court reinstated the 
district court’s disposition of the case.177 
By treating the political question doctrine as grounds for dismissal 
under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court used the structure set out in 
Baker v. Carr, which is discussed in depth below.  In Baker, the Court 
explicitly distinguished between subject matter jurisdiction and 
justiciability.  The district court in Baker had dismissed on the grounds 
that it lacked jurisdiction and that the plaintiff failed to state a claim 
on which relief could be granted.178  The Supreme Court identified 
                                               
 173. For example, the allegations in a complaint that seeks an injunction under 
standard equitable principles must support the conclusion that the plaintiff is 
threatened with irreparable injury and would have only an inadequate remedy at law.  
See, e.g., Pine Twp. Citizens’ Ass’n v. Arnold, 453 F. Supp. 594, 597–98 (W.D. Pa. 1978) 
(asserting that before convening a three-judge court, a single judge must determine 
whether a complaint formally alleges a basis for equitable relief, including irreparable 
injury and inadequacy of the remedy at law). 
 174. Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 3 (1973) (citing Morgan v. Rhodes, 456 F.2d 
608, 608–09 (6th Cir. 1972) (noting the dismissal in district court for failure to state a 
claim on which relief could be granted).  The court of appeals made the same point 
below in Morgan v. Rhodes.  456 F.2d at 608–09 (“The District Judge dismissed the 
complaint on motion without either answer or affidavits being filed by appellees, and 
without hearing.  His brief order stated that the pleading failed to state a claim 
cognizable under federal law.”). 
 175. See Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 12; Morgan, 456 F.2d at 615. 
 176. Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 5. 
 177. Id. at 10–12. 
 178. In the three-judge district court, the defendants had moved to dismiss for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted, 
and failure to join indispensable parties.  Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824, 826 (M.D. 
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those grounds as first “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction” and then 
“failure to state a justiciable cause of action.”179  It considered and 
rejected the political question argument under the second heading.180 
Nixon v. United States, which like Gilligan but unlike Baker was decided 
under the political question doctrine, follows the same pattern.  In that 
case the district court concluded that it had subject matter jurisdiction, 
and that “[t]he availability of the judicial remedy sought by plaintiff 
depends, therefore, on whether the controversy here is justiciable.”181  
The district court thus believed that non-justiciability would make 
relief unavailable in a case within the court’s jurisdiction.  Concluding 
that the case was not justiciable, the district court dismissed on that 
ground.182  The court of appeals affirmed, holding that “Walter 
Nixon’s claim is not justiciable.”183  The Supreme Court affirmed that 
judgment.  All three courts believed that it was possible for a case to be 
within the federal courts’ jurisdiction but not to be justiciable. 
The courts in Gilligan used the now-familiar concept found in Rule 
12(b)(6) to categorize cases in which the political question doctrine 
means that no relief will be available although the court has 
jurisdiction.  Earlier terminology from equity practice may be a source 
of confusion on this score because as Justice Holmes explained, 
“Courts sometimes say that there is no jurisdiction in equity when they 
mean only that equity ought not to give the relief asked.”184  When 
                                               
Tenn. 1959) (per curiam), rev’d, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).  The district court dismissed on 
the first two grounds and did not address the third.  Id. at 828. 
 179. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 196, 208–09 (1962). 
 180. Id. at 208–09 (considering political question doctrine under the justiciability 
heading). 
 181. Nixon v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 9, 11–12 (D.D.C. 1990), aff’d, 506 U.S. 224 
(1993).  Judge Nixon had sought a declaration that his conviction by the Senate was 
void.  Id. at 10. 
 182. Id. at 14.  The United States had asserted as defenses that the complaint failed 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, that the court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction, and that the action was nonjusticiable.  Brief for Respondents & 
Amicus Curiae United States Senate at 12–13, Nixon v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 9 
(D.D.C. 1990) (No. 91-740).  The district court did not indicate whether it understood 
dismissal for non-justiciability as a form of dismissal for failure to state a claim on which 
relief could be granted. 
 183. Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 184. Mass. State Grange v. Benton, 272 U.S. 525, 528 (1926).  Immediately after that 
sentence, Holmes continued, “In a strict sense the [lower c]ourt in this case had 
jurisdiction.  It had power to grant an injunction, and if it had granted one its decree, 
although wrong, would not have been void.”  Id.  The plaintiffs claimed that 
Massachusetts’s daylight savings time statutes were preempted by federal legislation on 
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courts say they lack jurisdiction in equity they do not mean that they 
lack the authority to decide the case on the grounds that the parties or 
the subject matter are outside their jurisdiction.  They mean that no 
relief will be granted, often because of principles that govern equitable 
remedies and do not require that the court resolve all the issues 
disputed between the parties.  When the plaintiff is subject to laches, 
for example, the court can decide that equitable relief is unavailable 
                                               
the subject.  The court below found that the plaintiffs had not made the requisite 
showing for a preliminary injunction:  that the case was “reasonably free from doubt” 
and that they faced “great and irreparable injury.”  Mass. State Grange v. Benton, 
10 F.2d 515, 515–16 (D. Mass. 1925) (per curiam) (three-judge district court).  The 
district court then went on to address the substance of plaintiffs’ challenge, and found 
that the state and federal laws were consistent.  Having reached that conclusion, the 
court found it unnecessary to “discuss the serious jurisdictional questions raised, either 
as to the rights of the plaintiffs or as to any power vested in the defendants by the 
Massachusetts act to enforce that act.”  Id. at 517 (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 
U.S. 447 (1923)).  The Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion by Justice Holmes.  
Benton, 272 U.S. at 529.  He endorsed the district court’s finding that state and federal 
law did not conflict in a single sentence, and then went on to emphasize “the important 
rule . . . that no injunction ought to issue against officers of a State clothed with 
authority to enforce the law in question, unless in a case reasonably free from doubt 
and when necessary to prevent great and irreparable injury.”  Id. at 527 (citation 
omitted).  Having found that the case before him was not an exception to that general 
principle of equity, Justice Holmes then made the point that courts sometimes say they 
have no jurisdiction when they mean that no relief is available under equitable 
principles.  Id. at 528.  Perhaps to emphasize the distinction, he concluded that “upon 
the merits we think it too plain to need argument that to grant an injunction upon the 
allegations of this bill would be to fly in the face of the rule which, as we have said, we 
think should be very strictly observed.”  Id. at 528–29.  The point that the case was 
decided on the merits and not on a jurisdictional ground was not lost on Justice 
McReynolds, who in a separate opinion said that the suit was actually against the State 
of Massachusetts, not its officers, and so was excluded from federal jurisdiction by the 
Eleventh Amendment.  Id. at 529. 
492 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:457 
 
without having to decide whether the plaintiff’s claims are otherwise 
meritorious.185  Political question cases often have that feature.186 
When the political question doctrine bars the relief the plaintiff seeks, 
the case is properly dismissed under rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted, but not for want of jurisdiction. 
                                               
 185. A plaintiff in equity who has delayed unreasonably may be denied relief, or 
granted only limited relief, under the equitable doctrine of laches.  DAN B. DOBBS, LAW 
OF REMEDIES 75 (2d ed. 1993).  The independence of laches and the merits is 
demonstrated by another principle Dobbs discusses, according to which the defense 
of laches may be limited to delay that prejudiced the defendant.  As a result, a plaintiff 
complaining of trademark infringement may be barred from retrospective relief by 
laches but entitled to a prospective injunction.  Id. at 76.  In such situations, the 
defendant’s conduct is by hypothesis infringing, but retrospective relief is denied 
despite that feature of the merits. 
  In discussing another traditional equitable principle, the requirement that the 
remedy at law be inadequate, Dobbs makes the point about misleading references to 
lack of “jurisdiction.” 
A traditional locution of equity courts referred to the body of equity precedent 
and practice as “equity jurisdiction.”  Sometimes a bill in equity would be 
dismissed because there was no “equity jurisdiction,” and sometimes this 
phrase was used in dismissing an equitable claim under the adequacy rule.  But 
equity jurisdiction is not jurisdictional in the modern procedural sense. 
Id. at 88.  Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove agreed with the district court that the case 
should be dismissed “for want of equity” because the relief the plaintiff sought was 
beyond the courts’ authority to grant.  Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 551–52 
(1946). 
 186. The potentially confusing terminology that Holmes and Dobbs discuss is used 
in Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867), which was a political question 
case insofar as it held that a court could not control a discretionary function.  Refusing 
Mississippi leave to file, Chief Justice Chase said that “this court has no jurisdiction of 
a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties.”  Id. at 501.  He 
did not deny that the case fell into the Court’s original jurisdiction under Article III—
Mississippi had sued a citizen of another state, President Johnson being from 
Tennessee—but did conclude that no injunction would be issued.  That conclusion 
rested on the unavailability of remedies that would control executive or political 
discretion.  Id. at 499 (concluding that the President’s function under the 
Reconstruction Acts was not ministerial, but executive and political).  Chief Justice 
Chase likely believed that that for a court to enjoin an executive official with respect 
to a proposed non-ministerial act that was neither a tort nor an enforcement 
proceeding would have been to exercise political and not judicial power.  Neither the 
executive nor the legislature, Chief Justice Chase wrote, “can be restrained in its action 
by the judicial department; though the acts of both, when performed, are, in proper 
cases, subject to its cognizance.”  Id. at 500.  That statement and its caveat suggest that 
any constitutional problem was specifically with the remedy.  The reference to proper 
cases suggests, for example, that if one of those statutes bore on a dispute between 
private people, or an ex post action for damages against an officer, the courts would 
perform their usual function of assessing constitutionality. 
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c.  Substantial federal questions in the Supreme Court of the United States 
Like most legal principles, the Court’s political question doctrine 
has some straightforward applications.  Because that doctrine is one of 
federal law, state courts are required to apply it.  When the Supreme 
Court had much more mandatory appellate jurisdiction over the state 
courts than it has today, the Court developed the principle that an 
appeal from a state court decision that presented no substantial federal 
question could be dismissed for want of statutory jurisdiction instead 
of being decided on the merits.187  If the state court was clearly correct 
under the Court’s precedent, an appeal presented no substantial 
federal question.188  Perhaps paradoxically, a conclusion about the merits 
of the federal question implied that the Court had no jurisdiction under 
the statute governing appeals from state courts.  In the same line of 
cases, the Court came to the conclusion that when a state court was 
obviously right, either affirmance, or dismissal for want of a substantial 
federal question, was a permissible outcome.189  When it did either, the 
Court was responding to the substance of the state court’s decision. 
In the early twentieth century, the Court decided three cases 
involving the Guarantee Clause that illustrate the two options provided 
by its doctrine and the substantive grounds of even a dismissal for want 
of jurisdiction.  The first, Pacific States Telephone, originated in the 
Oregon courts, where Oregon prevailed on the merits.  The case then 
came to the Supreme Court of the United States via writ of error.190 
As discussed above, the Court relied on Luther for the proposition 
that Congress’s recognition of Oregon as a state, with the implication 
                                               
 187. Throughout the Court’s history, its appellate jurisdiction over the state courts 
but not the federal courts has depended on the lower court’s resolution of a federal 
question.  See Herbert Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court:  Reflections 
on the Law and the Logistics of Direct Review, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043, 1045, 1048 
(1977) (discussing the history and development of the Supreme Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction, in particular the expansion of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction 
due to the “enormous growth of federal enactments and judicial extrapolation of the 
constitutional restraints upon state action”).  Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2012) (giving 
the Court certiorari jurisdiction over all decisions by the federal courts of appeals), 
with 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2012) (giving the Court certiorari jurisdiction only over state 
court decisions that turn on a federal question). 
 188. See Francis J. Ulman & Frank H. Spears, Dismissed for Want of a Substantial Federal 
Question, 20 B.U. L. REV. 501, 513–16 (1940) (describing development of the doctrine). 
 189. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y v. Brown, 187 U.S. 308, 314–15 (1902).  Like all 
three of the political question cases discussed in this Section, Equitable Life Assurance 
Society was written by Justice, later Chief Justice, Edward Douglass White. 
 190. Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 136–37 (1912). 
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that its government was republican, was binding on the courts.191  The 
opinion concludes that because the issues are political “and not, 
therefore, within the reach of judicial power, it follows that the case 
presented is not within our jurisdiction, and the writ of error must 
therefore be, and it is, dismissed for want of jurisdiction.”192 
By itself, Chief Justice White’s statement is ambiguous.  The Court 
might have lacked jurisdiction under Article III.  The other possibility 
is that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the case presented no 
substantial federal question under the jurisdictional statutes.  Chief 
Justice White’s earlier characterization of Luther as the “leading and 
absolutely controlling case” indicates that Pacific States Telephone rested on 
statutory grounds.  That characterization indicated that the outcome was 
clear, and when the outcome was clear a case presented no substantial 
federal question for purposes of the statute.193  The same implication 
that the case presented no substantial federal question under the 
statute appears in his explanation that a text-based argument against 
the company’s contentions was not even necessary “since the repugnancy 
of those contentions to the letter and spirit of that text is so conclusively 
established by prior decisions of this court as to cause the matter to be 
absolutely foreclosed.”194  In other contexts the modifiers “conclusively” 
and “absolutely” might be just rhetoric, but in appeals from state courts 
like Pacific States Telephone they bore on the Court’s jurisdiction.  When 
a state court decides a federal question in accordance with principles 
conclusively established by an absolutely controlling Supreme Court 
precedent that absolutely forecloses contrary argument, the case 
presents no substantial federal question in the Court. 
The case immediately following Pacific States Telephone in the United 
States Reports also supports the conclusion that Chief Justice White 
found no statutory jurisdiction in the prior case.  Kiernan v. Portland195 
involved a Guarantee Clause challenge to local level direct democracy 
in Oregon.  Having that day decided Pacific States Telephone, the Court 
dismissed the writ of error in Kiernan because it presented no question 
“sufficiently substantial to support the exertion of jurisdiction.”196  
Kiernan’s reference to substantiality shows that the case was dismissed 
for want of statutory jurisdiction. 
                                               
 191. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
 192. Pac. States Tel., 223 U.S. at 151. 
 193. Id. at 143, 146. 
 194. Id. at 142–43. 
 195. 223 U.S. 151 (1912). 
 196. Id. at 164. 
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Any remaining doubt whether Pacific States Telephone had been 
dismissed under Article III was dispelled a few years later.  Ohio ex rel. 
Davis v. Hildebrant197 came to the Court from the Supreme Court of 
Ohio.  The Ohio Constitution provided for review of legislative acts 
through referendum, and a statute redrawing the State’s congressional 
districts had been disapproved via that process.198  Plaintiffs in the state 
court sought an order directing Ohio election officials to disregard the 
referendum on the grounds that the power over congressional elections 
vested in state legislatures by Article I, Section 4, of the Constitution could 
not be exercised via direct democracy.199  The Supreme Court of Ohio 
rejected that argument, pointing out that the most recent act of 
Congress governing congressional districting had been drafted so as to 
refer to the legislative authority of the states, not just their 
legislatures.200  The Ohio court did not discuss the Guarantee Clause. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed in an 
opinion by Chief Justice White.  The Chief Justice turned the plaintiffs’ 
argument under Article I into an argument under Article IV, because 
the argument 
must rest upon the assumption that to include the referendum in 
the scope of the legislative power is to introduce a virus which 
destroys that power, which in effect annihilates representative 
government and causes a State where such condition exists to be not 
republican in form in violation of the guarantee of the Constitution.201 
That argument was “plainly without substance” because it disregarded 
“the settled rule that the question of whether that guaranty of the 
Constitution has been disregarded presents no justiciable controversy, 
but involves the exercise by Congress of the authority vested in it by 
the Constitution.”202  The absence of a justiciable controversy did not 
                                               
 197. 241 U.S. 565 (1916). 
 198. Id. at 566. 
 199. State ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 114 N.E. 55, 56 (Ohio 1916), aff’d, 241 U.S. 565 
(1916).  Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he Times, Places 
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed 
in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make 
or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators.”  U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 200. Hildebrant, 114 N.E. at 55; cf. Ohio v. Gallagher, 425 U.S. 257, 259 (1976) (per 
curiam) (explaining that the Supreme Court of Ohio “speaks as a court only through 
the syllabi of its cases,” not its opinions). 
 201. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. at 569 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4). 
 202. Id. (citing Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912)).  
Although Chief Justice White used the word “controversy,” which is found in Article 
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deprive either the Supreme Courts of Ohio or the United States of 
jurisdiction, and the Chief Justice made clear that his Court was 
deciding the merits. 
It is apparent from these reasons that there must either be a 
dismissal for want of jurisdiction because there is no power to 
reexamine the state questions foreclosed by the decision below and 
because of the want of merit in the Federal questions relied upon, 
or a judgment of affirmance, it being absolutely indifferent as to the 
result which of the two be applied.203 
Because of “the subject-matter of the controversy and the Federal 
characteristics which inhere in it,” the Court decided to affirm rather 
than dismiss.204  It thereby decided the case on the merits. 
For the White Court the political question doctrine was not a 
jurisdictional limitation.  It was a principle of federal law that governed 
decisions on the merits in both state and federal court.  As such, it 
could be so clearly correctly applied by a state court that the Supreme 
Court of the United States could either dismiss an appeal or affirm. 
d.   Justiciability 
Although the Supreme Court has not provided a canonical account 
of justiciability, its use of the terminology and the pattern of results just 
described yield a reasonably coherent understanding.  A question or 
issue is nonjusticiable when its resolution is confided to a political actor 
whose conclusion will be absolutely binding on the courts.  A claim is 
nonjusticiable when the relationship between political and judicial 
power means that no relief can be granted on it, and a case with no 
justiciable claim is not justiciable.  Justiciability is distinct from subject 
matter jurisdiction in that a court can have jurisdiction to decide a case 
that turns on nonjusticiability, and indeed a court can award relief in 
a case in which an issue is nonjusticiable.  When a plaintiff with a 
meritorious claim relies on the political branches’ recognition of a 
foreign government, for example, the political question doctrine 
underlies part of the court’s reasoning in a successful suit. 
                                               
III, he likely meant a dispute in a general sense rather than a lawsuit.  Hildebrant was 
in his Court as one of the “cases” arising under the Constitution and laws of the United 
States to which the Constitution extends the federal courts’ jurisdiction, not one of 
the “controversies” listed in Article III.  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (extending judicial 
power to enumerated cases and controversies). 
 203. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. at 570. 
 204. Id. 
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The difference between jurisdiction and justiciability explains why 
the political question doctrine generally applies in state court.  When 
some source of federal law assigns final decisional authority to a 
political actor, the state courts must respect that federal rule just as 
much as the federal courts must.  State courts may not interfere with 
the political discretion of federal political actors.  State courts are not, 
however, subject to the jurisdictional limits of Article III.205  In general 
they must implement the political question doctrine created by federal 
law, as they must implement other principles of federal law that are not 
confined to federal institutions the way Article III is. 
2.   Baker v. Carr, Jurisdiction, and Finality 
Contrary to common impression, Justice Brennan’s opinion in Baker 
classifies the political question doctrine as one of non-judicial finality, 
not as a limitation on Article III or statutory jurisdiction.  Baker treated 
subject matter jurisdiction and justiciability as distinct questions.206  
The Court thus recognized that the political question doctrine could 
govern cases within the courts’ jurisdiction, as had happened in Luther, 
Coleman, and Hildebrant. 
The Court in Baker explicitly distinguished between subject matter 
jurisdiction and justiciability.  A careful reading of the opinion, and in 
particular the now much-quoted paragraph that lists six characteristics 
of prior political question cases, shows that the Court regarded that 
doctrine as producing non-judicial finality as to some legal 
questions.207  An examination of the cases that Justice Brennan had 
                                               
 205.  
We have recognized often that the constraints of Article III do not apply to 
state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not bound by the limitations 
of a case or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability even when they 
address issues of federal law, as when they are called upon to interpret the 
Constitution or, in this case, a federal statute. 
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (citations omitted).  The ASARCO 
Court had no occasion to consider whether any federal non-jurisdictional principles 
of justiciability might apply in state court. 
 206. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 196 (1962) (concluding that the district court 
dismissed because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and the plaintiffs did not state 
a justiciable cause of action).  The Court then discussed subject matter jurisdiction, 
standing, and justiciability under separate headings.  Id. at 198, 204, 208. 
 207. 
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the 
settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, 
although each has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a 
function of the separation of powers.  Prominent on the surface of any case 
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reviewed earlier in the opinion, cases that form the basis of that 
paragraph, shows that all six characteristics were indicators that a 
political actor had the last word in the application of law to fact.  Justice 
Brennan undertook to distinguish all of those cases from Baker itself, 
so he had no occasion to state general principles governing the political 
question doctrine.208  Although he did not offer a comprehensive account 
of the doctrine, he treated political questions as issues on which a non-
judicial federal decision maker was final, and he did not present the 
doctrine as a limit on the Article III jurisdiction.209 
The Court’s review of earlier cases begins by formulating the 
question as one of finality.  “We have said that ‘In determining whether 
a question falls within [the political question] category, the 
appropriateness under our system of government of attributing finality 
to the action of the political departments and also the lack of 
satisfactory criteria for a judicial determination are dominant 
considerations.’”210 
When the Court decided Baker, its most recent political question 
decision outside of the apportionment context was Coleman v. Miller.  
Justice Brennan’s language in Baker strongly suggests that Coleman 
provided a template for the first two features his opinion listed.211 
In Coleman v. Miller . . . this Court held that the questions of how long 
a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution remained open 
                                               
held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; 
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; 
or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a 
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s 
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect 
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for 
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the 
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments on one question. 
Id. at 217. 
 208. “Since that review [of earlier cases] is undertaken solely to demonstrate that 
neither singly nor collectively do these cases support a conclusion that this 
apportionment case is nonjusticiable, we of course do not explore their implications 
in other contexts.”  Id. at 210. 
 209. Justice Brennan discussed the Court’s earlier political question cases in order 
to distinguish them from Baker.  A doctrine of non-judicial finality for federal political 
actors would not bar a suit like Baker, so the account that Justice Brennan gave of the 
earlier cases was very much in keeping with his conclusion in the case before the Court. 
 210. Baker, 369 U.S. at 210 (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454–55 (1939)). 
 211. Id. at 217. 
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to ratification, and what effect a prior rejection had on a subsequent 
ratification, were committed to congressional resolution and involved 
criteria of decision that necessarily escaped the judicial grasp.212 
Indeed, the word “commitment” may have come directly from Justice 
Black’s opinion in Coleman.213  Chief Justice Hughes in that case also 
stressed the difficulties for courts of the questions Congress would be 
called on to address in deciding on timeliness in enacting 
constitutional amendments.214  That concern is echoed in the second 
consideration on Justice Brennan’s list.215 
Similar textual evidence points to Luther, which was decided on the 
merits pursuant to a political decision, as another source for the first 
two features listed in Baker. 
Clearly, several factors were thought by the Court in Luther to make 
the question there “political”:  the commitment to the other 
branches of the decision as to which is the lawful state government; 
the unambiguous action by the President, in recognizing the charter 
government as the lawful authority; the need for finality in the 
executive’s decision; and the lack of criteria by which a court could 
determine which form of government was republican.216 
In the next paragraph, Justice Brennan again indicated that Luther 
turned in part on the second feature on his list.  “But the only 
significance that Luther could have for our immediate purposes is in its 
holding that the Guaranty Clause is not a repository of judicially 
manageable standards which a court could utilize independently in 
                                               
 212. Id. at 214 (footnote omitted).  Justice Brennan’s reference to Coleman indicates 
that he had identified the common ground of the seven Justices in the majority on the 
political question issue, no five of whom joined an opinion. 
 213. “And decision of a ‘political question’ by the ‘political department’ to which 
the Constitution has committed it ‘conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other 
officers, citizens and subjects of . . . government.’”  Coleman, 307 U.S. at 457 (Black, J., 
concurring) (emphasis added) (quoting Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 
(1890)).  Three of the Justices who joined that opinion—Black, Douglas, and 
Frankfurter—were on the Baker Court. 
 214.  
Where are to be found the criteria for such a judicial determination?  None 
are to be found in Constitution or statute . . . .  In short, the question of a 
reasonable time in many cases would involve, as in this case it does involve, an 
appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social[,] and 
economic, which can hardly be said to be within the appropriate range of 
evidence receivable in a court of justice. 
Id. at 453. 
 215. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
 216. Id. at 222 (footnote omitted). 
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order to identify a State’s lawful government.”217  On Justice Brennan’s 
reading of prior cases, a textual commitment to a political actor and a 
lack of standards appropriate to independent judicial decision were 
prominent on the surface of the Court’s two great political question 
precedents.  Both of those cases turned on non-judicial finality.  In 
neither case did the Court deny jurisdiction under Article III. 
Non-judicial finality resolves what is otherwise a baffling problem 
concerning the first characteristic Justice Brennan listed, textual 
commitment to another branch of government.218  All of Congress’s 
powers are committed to it by the text, yet most exercises of those 
powers do not give rise to political questions.  Courts decide for 
themselves whether federal statutes are constitutional.  In the context of 
quasi-adjudicatory decisions by actors other than courts, however, the 
textual commitment referred to is one of quasi-adjudicatory authority, 
not ordinary legislative or executive power.  That is the context Justice 
Brennan set by referring to finality in a political branch, and the context 
in which he discussed the Court’s prior political question cases. 
The prior decisions Justice Brennan discussed also illuminate the 
third characteristic of those cases to which he drew attention, “the 
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind 
clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”219  The cases alluded to with that phrase 
turned on non-judicial finality.  Under the heading of “Foreign 
Relations,” Justice Brennan had explained that questions in that realm 
“frequently . . . involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably 
committed to the executive or legislature.”220  In the accompanying 
footnote, he cited a case from the 19th century, Doe v. Braden.221 
In Doe v. Braden, one party in a Florida land dispute asked the court 
to find that the King of Spain had not had the authority to cancel prior 
land grants, which the King had purported to do in the treaty ceding 
Florida to the United States.222  Chief Justice Taney concluded that the 
question of the King’s power was political and not judicial.223  That 
question had been conclusively resolved when the United States 
entered into the treaty, which was accompanied by declarations of both 
                                               
 217. Id. at 223. 
 218. See id. at 217. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 211. 
 221. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635 (1854). 
 222. Id. at 654. 
 223. Id. at 657. 
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parties that the King had annulled prior grants.224  The discretionary 
decision was whether to make the treaty.  The legal questions involved 
public rights:  the power of the King of Spain to act through a treaty, 
and the resulting sovereign and proprietary interests of the United 
States.  The treaty, an act of the United States as a sovereign operating 
with respect to other sovereigns, bound U.S. courts as to the legal 
assumptions on which it rested. 
Braden is an example of non-judicial finality and not lack of 
jurisdiction.  The Court in Braden did not deny its authority to decide, 
or that of the trial court.  Rather, it affirmed on the merits a judgment 
that rested on the assumption that the treaty accomplished what the 
United States and Spain said it accomplished.  The King’s power to 
cancel certain land grants was used as a premise for decision, not as a 
bar thereto.225 
                                               
 224.  
It was for the President and Senate to determine whether the king, by the 
constitution and laws of Spain, was authorized to make this stipulation and to 
ratify a treaty containing it.  They have recognized his power by accepting this 
stipulation as a part of the compact, and ratifying the treaty which contains it.  
The constituted and legitimate authority of the United States, therefore, has 
acquired and received this land as public property. 
Id. at 657–58. 
 225. The second case cited as an example of policy discretion demonstrably 
committed to another branch also involved a treaty, along with a later statute that 
affected its operation.  Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784 (Curtis, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. 
Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799) (deferring to executive and legislative branches on the 
question whether a foreign sovereign has violated a treaty), aff’d, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 481 
(1862).  The plaintiff, an importer of Russian hemp, claimed that a lower tariff rate 
for hemp imported from India was inconsistent with a treaty giving Russian imports 
most-favored-nation status.  Id. at 784–85. 
  Justice Curtis, anticipating the Court’s decision in Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889), maintained that a later-enacted 
statute would override a treaty if they conflicted.  Taylor, 23 F. Cas. at 785.  He was not, 
however, willing to conclude that the later statute with the lower tariff violated the 
treaty. 
Is it a judicial question, whether a treaty with a foreign sovereign has been 
violated by him; whether the consideration of a particular stipulation in a 
treaty, has been voluntarily withdrawn by one party, so that it is no longer 
obligatory on the other; whether the views and acts of a foreign sovereign, 
manifested through his representative have given just occasion to the political 
departments of our government to withhold the execution of a promise 
contained in a treaty, or to act in direct contravention of such a promise?  I 
apprehend not. 
Id. at 787.  Because those questions were confided to Congress, it was “immaterial” to 
the court whether the statute violated the treaty.  If it did not, “the plaintiff [had] no 
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The fourth characteristic that indicates a political question, “the 
impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without 
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government,”226 
also very likely derived from a case that rested on non-judicial finality, 
Field v. Clark.  That case treated congressional certification of an enrolled 
bill as conclusive.  After discussing Coleman and the enactment of 
constitutional amendments, Justice Brennan in Baker said, 
Similar considerations apply to the enacting process [for statutes]:  
“The respect due to coequal and independent departments,” and 
the need for finality and certainty about the status of a statute 
contribute to judicial reluctance to inquire whether, as passed, it 
complied with all requisite formalities.227 
Once again, Justice Brennan probably drew his phraseology, here the 
word “respect,” from the earlier case.  Having concluded that the bill as 
enacted was the authoritative text, the Court decided Field on the merits. 
The fifth characteristic Justice Brennan canvassed, “an unusual need 
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made,”228 
was also a ground of non-judicial finality, not lack of jurisdiction.  
Earlier in Baker, Justice Brennan had discussed “this Court’s refusal to 
                                               
case.”  Id.  If it did, Congress’s act was “the municipal law of the country,” and 
complaints should be addressed to the political branches, not the courts.  Id. 
  Justice Brennan in Baker cited Taylor without elaboration, 369 U.S. 186, 211 
n.32 (1962), leaving to inference how Taylor involved standards that defy judicial 
application or the exercise of discretion demonstrably committed to a political branch.  
On the latter point, Congress demonstrably has the power to pass legislation that 
reflects the state of U.S. foreign relations, for example its relations with Russia 
concerning tariffs.  On the former point, the question whether one party to a treaty 
has breached it, or has decided not to insist on it, could be very difficult for a court to 
resolve.  Not only is international law often vague, but courts do not have the 
information about foreign relations necessary to answer such questions.  One party to 
a treaty might quietly agree to allow the other to act in a way inconsistent with it, 
perhaps in return for some seemingly unrelated concession on another issue.  
Whether Russia had breached the treaty, or whether a seemingly inconsistent U.S. 
tariff was nevertheless consistent with this country’s obligations under the treaty, was 
by itself a question of law.  Relations between nations, like relations between 
individuals, are not only about legal rights.  Whether to assert a legal position is a 
question of policy, not law, and nations, like individuals, may have rights that they do 
not wish to assert.  If the United States acts on the assumption that a treaty permits 
some action, like adopting a tariff rate, it decides both law and policy:  what is this 
country entitled to, and what is it prepared to assert it is entitled to? 
 226. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
 227. Id. at 214 (quoting Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672, 676–77 
(1892)). 
 228. Id. at 217. 
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review the political departments’ determination of when or whether a 
war has ended.  Dominant is the need for finality in the political 
determination, for emergency’s nature demands ‘A prompt and 
unhesitating obedience.’”229  The “prompt and unhesitating 
obedience” at issue in Martin v. Mott,230 the case Justice Brennan relied 
on, was a militia member’s obligation to report for duty at the 
President’s call.  Whether that call really was in response to the 
exigencies set out in the militia statute was up to the President, whose 
decision was not to be questioned elsewhere. 
Is the President the sole and exclusive judge whether the exigency 
has arisen, or is it to be considered as an open question, upon which 
every officer to whom the orders of the President are addressed, may 
decide for himself, and equally open to be contested by every militia-
man who shall refuse to obey the orders of the President?231 
In Martin, the Court relied on the political question principle to supply 
a premise on which to decide the merits.  Mott sued Martin, and 
Martin’s defense relied on the court martial’s judgment, which in turn 
relied on the President’s order, which rested on the President’s 
determination.  The Court did not suggest that there was any lack of 
jurisdiction in the court martial, in the New York court in which Mott 
first sued, or on writ of error to it from the highest court of New York.  
Justice Brennan’s recognition that all those tribunals had jurisdiction 
shows that his fifth characteristic was about non-judicial finality, not 
lack of jurisdiction. 
For Justice Brennan, prior cases sought to avoid “embarrassment 
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one 
question”232 by giving conclusive effect to prior political-branch 
decisions.  The sixth characteristic he listed was also a marker of non-
judicial finality.  Often the political branches act without a 
pronouncement on anything, but they frequently make such 
pronouncements when they have to apply a legal standard to some 
factual situation.  Before summarizing the earlier political question 
cases, Baker had explained that many questions involving foreign 
relations “uniquely demand single-voiced statement[s] of the 
                                               
 229. Id. at 213 (quoting Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 30 (1827)). 
 230. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827). 
 231. Id. at 29–30.  Martin was a collateral challenge to Mott’s conviction by a court 
martial for failing to report.  Martin was a deputy marshal who had seized Mott’s 
property to carry out a fine imposed by the court martial whom Mott sued for replevin.  
Id. at 28. 
 232. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
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Government’s views.”233  Pointing to the need for “single-voiced 
statement[s] of the Government’s views” emphasizes that the Court 
was talking about statements of position, not all actions that may rest 
on a position. 
Perhaps most important for understanding that reference to a single 
voice in international relations, and the later-listed characteristic that 
alludes to it, is the case cited in a footnote, once again Doe v. Braden.  
The U.S. Government’s view on the validity of the Spanish land grant 
in dispute, expressed in its declaration and the President’s ratification 
of a treaty with Spain’s declaration, was indeed a pronouncement.  
Moreover, it was a pronouncement on behalf of the United States as a 
sovereign acting with respect to other sovereigns, to whom the internal 
structure of the U.S. government is of no concern.  For another 
component of that government later to undercut that assertion would 
not be consistent with the Constitution’s structure governing foreign 
relations, in which the complexities of American separation of powers 
and federalism are largely kept out of the view of external sovereigns.234  
Having found the Executive’s statement about the land grant 
conclusive, the Court went on to decide Braden on the merits. 
Justice Brennan in Baker formulated the political question principle 
as one of non-judicial finality, discussed prior cases turning on non-
judicial finality, and then summarized those cases in his well-known 
paragraph.  Read in light of the rest of the opinion, that paragraph 
treats the political question doctrine as a principle of conclusive 
application of law to fact by political decision makers.  In the decades 
after Baker, the Court has only once relied on that precedent in finding 
that the political question doctrine controlled a case.  It did so in Nixon 
v. United States and treated the Senate’s conviction of Judge Nixon as 
conclusive and not subject to judicial review.  The Court has never held 
that the political question doctrine is a limit on the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts.  To do so would be a departure from, not an application 
of, Baker v. Carr. 
                                               
 233. Id. at 211. 
 234. “Recognition is a topic on which the Nation must ‘“speak . . . with one voice.’  
That voice must be the President’s.”  Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2086 (2015) 
(internal citations omitted) (quoting Am. Ins. Assn. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 
(2003); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000)).  Zivotofsky 
concerned a clash between Congress and the President; Garamendi and Crosby 
concerned clashes between federal and state policy.  In all three cases, a single actor 
spoke for the United States despite this country’s complex constitutional structure of 
federalism and separation of powers. 
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C.   Political Questions, Political Power, and Judicial Power 
This Section identifies the principles that explain the Court’s results 
and the derivation of those principles from the constitutional 
separation of political and judicial power. 
The two branches of the political question doctrine have a common 
theme.  In each of them, the distinction between judicial and political 
power poses a problem because one component of the government is 
called on to perform a function more associated with the other.  Non-
judicial finality arises only when a political decision maker is called on 
to apply law to a particular set of facts.  Although political actors 
sometimes perform that function, it is quintessentially the role of the 
courts.  The political question doctrine identifies some of the situations 
in which the non-judicial decision is binding on the judiciary.235 
The doctrine’s limits on the judiciary’s authority to give prospective 
relief arise only when the courts are called on to go beyond requiring 
compliance with the law and require or forbid some conduct that is 
itself legally indifferent.  The plaintiffs in Gilligan did not argue that 
the law permitted only one choice of weapons or tactics for the Ohio 
National Guard in dealing with riots.  Rather, they asked the court to 
choose among the legally permissible options in order to prevent 
unnecessary harm to civilians.  In devising relief of that kind, courts make 
the type of policy decisions normally entrusted to political actors.236 
When the political question doctrine produces non-judicial finality, 
it enables a political actor to do what courts normally do.  When the 
doctrine limits judicial remedies that control discretion, it keeps courts 
                                               
 235. Non-judicial finality is sometimes created by the Constitution, sometimes by 
sub-constitutional law.  The impeachment provisions of their own force make the 
Senate’s decisions conclusive on the courts.  The enrolled bill doctrine, by contrast, is 
likely subject to change by legislation.  With respect to non-judicial finality, therefore, 
the political question doctrine answers two distinct but closely related questions:  
whether the Constitution makes a political actor final, and whether sub-constitutional 
law may make a political actor final.  The doctrine considers these questions together 
because the answers rest on the same considerations concerning the difference 
between political and judicial power. 
 236. In a wrongful death action, by contrast, the court asks whether a particular use 
of deadly force was reasonable, not whether the defendant had been properly trained.  
A Guardsman who receives proper training, carries an appropriate weapon, is subject 
to well-conceived doctrine, and panics and kills someone without reason, has acted 
unlawfully and will be accountable in a tort action.  Prospective remedies like 
injunctions differ fundamentally from retrospective remedies like damages because 
damages are assessed after decisions are made, and need not be based on guesses 
about what will happen in the future. 
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from reaching into the political sphere.  In both contexts, the doctrine 
draws the line between political and judicial power in cases in which 
that line’s location is subject to doubt, because the powers in some 
sense overlap one another.  It draws the line in favor of a political 
decision maker, rather than the courts. 
The Court’s rationale for non-judicial finality can be seen in three 
leading cases:  Luther, Coleman, and Nixon v. United States.  Each of them 
has two features that explain why the courts would treat a non-judicial 
decision as final.  Chief Justice Taney made the first feature plain in 
Luther:  the identity of a State’s legitimate government has very 
important consequences for a great many people.  As he explained, if 
the Charter government of Rhode Island had been unlawful, then it 
illegally collected taxes and used force with no legal justification.237  In 
similar fashion, the content of the Constitution’s text has 
consequences of the highest importance for everyone in the country.  
In impeachment cases, the widespread consequences of a single legal 
decision flow from identifying officers who may lawfully exercise 
power.  Whether one President has been removed and replaced with 
someone else is a momentous question for the entire country.  In each 
of those cases, the application of a legal rule to one particular set of 
facts affects the public at large in a fundamental way. 
The second feature shared by those three leading cases concerns the 
legal standards involved.  In all of them, the applicable legal rule 
involved highly delicate normative questions that the rules themselves 
did not explicitly resolve.  Whether a purported state government is 
lawful is one of political legitimacy.  In Chief Justice Hughes’s view in 
Coleman, the timeliness of a constitutional amendment depended on 
the nation’s continuing need for change, which in turn depended on 
many political, economic, and social factors.238  Those are judgments 
about the public interest on a very broad scale.  In an impeachment 
trial, the Senate must decide whether the impeached officer has 
engaged in culpable official conduct that makes that person unfit to 
exercise power.239 
                                               
 237. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 38–39 (1849). 
 238. See supra note 214. 
 239. Discussing the Senate as a court of impeachment, Alexander Hamilton, writing 
under his pen name “Publius,” wrote, 
The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offences which proceed from the 
misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of 
some public trust.  They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be 
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The other branch of the doctrine, relied on in Gilligan, also rests on 
those two rationales, with the second being especially prominent.  That 
aspect of the doctrine limits judicial intrusion into political discretion, 
and operates where that discretion is at its height:  with respect to 
military and national security matters.  Gilligan itself provides an 
instructive example.  In planning for riots, or dealing with a riot, 
political decision makers face questions of life and death.  They must 
assess and weigh risks concerning the deaths rioters may cause and the 
deaths the military may cause in putting down a riot.  Just as too much 
force can needlessly kill those against whom it is directed, too little 
force, or force badly deployed, can let violence continue when it could 
have been contained. 
Slightly below the surface in Gilligan is the other consideration 
found in the non-judicial finality cases.  As riot control exemplifies, 
military decisions regularly affect a large number of people in much 
the same way.  The Ohio National Guard’s riot planning affected all 
potential participants in and victims of rioting, and when implemented 
that policy would apply to hundreds or thousands of people at once. 
Together, those two features can make a strong case for judicial 
deference to political decisions that normally would be reviewed by the 
courts, and for judicial non-interference with discretion.  When a 
single legal judgment affects many people, having one voice speak first 
and conclusively is of great value.  Luther makes this point.  To comply 
with the law, people need to know who the law-givers and other 
                                               
denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately 
to the society itself. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 338 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey and James 
McClellan, eds., 2001); cf. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHMENT:  A HANDBOOK 37 
(1974) (arguing that impeachable offenses, like treason and bribery, “are offenses 
(1) which are extremely serious, (2) which in some way corrupt or subvert the political 
and governmental process, and (3) which are plainly wrong in themselves to a person 
of honor, or to a good citizen, regardless of words on the statute book”).  All three 
criteria call for normative judgment and the second and third call for judgments about 
the public interest and the obligations of citizenship. 
  Another aspect of the applicable legal rule may also matter, though it does not 
appear in the Court’s most prominent cases.  As the Court stressed in Field, the rules 
for adoption of statutes apply to facts that arise in the legislative process.  
Congressional officers who certify passage of a bill judge their own conduct and that 
of the houses for which they act.  Those rules introduce another source of delicacy in 
their application:  because legislative officers are called on to report on their own 
actions, to say that they have reported incorrectly is close to saying that they are not 
just mistaken, but lying.  That led the Court in Field to invoke the respect due to 
coordinate branches and the Court in Baker to echo that sentiment. 
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government officials are.  If private people cannot tell which 
individuals really are government officials, their uncertainty will 
undermine many important activities, like paying taxes and making 
contracts.  Professor Charles Black emphasized the same factor with 
respect to presidential impeachment.240  Wondering whether a 
President who had been convicted by the Senate had actually been 
removed could plunge the country into chaos.  The sooner a 
conclusive answer is available, the less damage that doubt will cause.  
Under those circumstances, the ordinary arrangement in which 
legislatures and executives act, subject to judicial review at some 
indefinite time in the future, can turn uncertainty into paralysis. 
Second, some legal norms lend themselves to application by 
politically knowledgeable and accountable decision makers.  When the 
Federal Convention chose the Senate and not the ordinary courts for 
the trial of impeachments, it put the question whether the Chief 
Executive and other officers could be trusted with the people’s power 
in the hands of the people’s representatives.  Those representatives 
would be familiar with the judgments that must be made in matters of 
state.  Judges are selected for technical expertise in law not for their 
ability to decide how to deal with riots, or whether a state government 
satisfies basic principles of political morality of the American republic. 
Those practical arguments align with the concepts of judicial and 
political power.  The quintessential role of the courts is the neutral 
application of law to specific facts that involve specific parties.  
Balancing competing considerations involving large numbers of 
people, and deciding for themselves what is right and wrong, are tasks 
for the politically accountable.  The larger the number of parties 
affected, and the more value-laden the legal standards involved, the 
more any particular decision smacks of political and not judicial power.  
Underlying the political question doctrine is thus a paradigm of the 
judicial role.241  The Court’s cases reflect the conclusion that in some 
                                               
 240. Black described the scenario in which a President is removed by the Senate 
and then reinstated by the Court, possibly by a 5-4 vote, and said, “I don’t think I 
possess the resources of rhetoric adequate to characterize the absurdity of that 
position.”  BLACK, supra note 239, at 54. 
 241. Luther invokes another feature of the judicial power that arises from the fact 
that courts decide cases about particular parties:  different adjudications can resolve 
the same factual issue differently.  As Chief Justice Taney explained, the plaintiffs in 
Luther raised questions of fact that were proper for a jury.  Different juries, however, 
might resolve the factual dispute differently, with one concluding that the charter 
government had stayed in power and another that it had been replaced with the Dorr 
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situations where judges would be taken far out of the role, the 
applicable legal rules assign authority elsewhere.  The Constitution 
makes, or permits, that assignment because the idea of judicial power 
permits or even requires it.242 
The political question doctrine does not rest on limits on the federal 
courts’ authority to decide cases.  It does reflect an attempt to integrate 
that authority with the functions of the political branches, especially 
those functions that very much resemble adjudication. 
II.   POLITICAL RIGHTS, STANDING, AND WHAT THE  
POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE ONCE WAS 
Two Reconstruction cases, Mississippi v. Johnson and Georgia v. 
Stanton, are frequently classified as political question decisions.  As I 
explained above, the Court’s rationale in Mississippi v. Johnson puts it 
in the same category as Gilligan, in which the autonomy of the political 
branches limits the orders the courts may lawfully give them.243  Georgia 
v. Stanton, which reached a similar result but on different grounds, 
would today be classified as a standing case.  It might also still be called 
a political question case in that the State of Georgia lacked standing 
because the interest it sought to assert was wholly political.244 
                                               
constitution.  Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 41–42 (1849).  Political decision makers can 
provide uniformity of decision when courts may not be able to. 
 242. The legal rule that creates non-judicial finality need not itself come from the 
Constitution.  Four categories are possible, and each one probably is occupied.  First, 
in some circumstances non-judicial finality is constitutionally mandatory.  For example, it 
is unlikely that Congress could, by statute, give any court appellate jurisdiction over 
the Senate as a court of impeachment, or even relax the preclusive effect of a judgment 
of conviction as to removal from office.  Second, there are some situations in which 
Congress may provide for absolute non-judicial finality but need not do so.  Whether 
a statute was properly enacted is probably such a question.  Third, as to some issues 
Congress may provide for partial finality in a non-judicial decision maker.  The bulk 
of agency adjudication, which is subject to judicial review in an appellate form, falls 
into this category.  Finally, as to some issues, or perhaps with respect to some interests, 
only a court (including a jury) may have any conclusive authority. 
 243. Whether Mississippi v. Johnson would be decided today on the same rationale is not 
clear.  Certainly, the Court would not accept the broad proposition that executive officers 
may not be enjoined from executing statutes, nor does the old distinction between 
discretionary and ministerial duties have the force it had in the nineteenth century. 
 244. A leading theme of this Article is that the political question doctrine as the 
Court now expounds it is not a limit on the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal 
courts.  The constitutional standing doctrine is such a limit, and it makes sense as such 
because it concerns the plaintiff’s interest, which is the subject matter of a lawsuit.  
Insofar as Georgia v. Stanton would today be classified as a political question case, the 
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Under current Supreme Court doctrine, Article III courts may 
adjudicate only cases in which the plaintiff has standing.  By that the 
Court means not only that some source of law must authorize the 
plaintiff to sue, but also that the legal rules that do so must meet certain 
criteria.  Those rules may enable suits by a private plaintiff only if the 
plaintiff has suffered or is threatened with an injury in fact, a category 
that does not include all harms that might be defined as actionable by 
sub-constitutional law.245  It is clear that one particular interest does 
not count:  a citizen’s interest that the law be complied with, either by 
the government or another private person.246 
After the Supreme Court dismissed the bill in Mississippi v. Johnson, 
another former Confederate state sought relief from the 
Reconstruction Acts of 1867 in the Supreme Court’s original 
jurisdiction.  In Georgia v. Stanton, Georgia had a slightly different 
theory.  The state sought to persuade the Court that property rights 
were at stake, and not just the political rights of sovereignty.247  At 
                                               
political question doctrine includes a limit on subject matter jurisdiction, but only 
because it overlaps with the Article III standing limitation. 
 245. The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three 
elements.”  Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  A plaintiff must first 
suffer an “‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally-protected interest which is 
(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent,’ not ‘conjectural’ or 
‘hypothetical.’”  Id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984)).  The second 
element requires “a causal connection between the injury and the conduct 
complained of,” which means that the injury must be “fairly traceable” to the 
defendant’s challenged action.  Id. at 560 (citing Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights 
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)).  “Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely 
‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”  Id. at 561 
(citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43). 
 246.  
We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available 
grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s 
interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief 
that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at 
large—does not state an Article III case or controversy. 
Id. at 573–74. 
 247.  
The bill [that Georgia asked leave to file] in setting forth the political rights 
of the State of Georgia, and of its people sought to be protected, averred 
among other things, that the State was owner of certain real estate and 
buildings therein . . . exceeding in value $5,000,000; and that putting the acts 
of Congress into execution and destroying the State would deprive it of the 
possession and enjoyment of its property.  This reference [to the State’s 
property was] not set up, however, as a specific or independent ground of 
relief. 
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argument, counsel for Georgia maintained that “the great objection, 
of the other side . . . that the subject-matter of this bill, the case stated, 
and the relief sought, are political in their nature,—is without force.”248 
The Court was not persuaded, concluding that it “possesse[d] no 
jurisdiction over the subject-matter presented in the bill for relief.”249  
That subject matter included both “political questions” and “rights, not 
of persons or property, but of a political character . . . .  For the rights 
for the protection of which our jurisdiction is invoked, are the rights 
of sovereignty, of political jurisdiction, of government, of corporate 
existence as a State, with all its constitutional powers and privileges.”250  
Courts protect a different kind of interest.  “No case of private rights 
or private property infringed, or in danger of actual or threatened 
infringement, is presented by the bill, in a judicial form, for the 
judgment of the court.”251 
In both Mississippi v. Johnson and Georgia v. Stanton, the Court 
appears to have concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject 
matter of the suit, where by the subject matter it meant the interests 
the plaintiffs presented for adjudication; those interests were political, 
and hence not the kind of legal rights that courts protect.  In similar 
fashion, the Court today regards standing as a limitation on the federal 
courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction.  Care must be taken in interpreting 
                                               
Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 53 (1868). 
 248. Id. at 67. 
 249. Id. at 77.  That conclusion meant that the Court did not have to consider the 
defendants’ argument that under Luther it was bound to regard the plaintiff 
government of Georgia as illegal, unrepublican, and provisional only, on the grounds 
that Congress had determined it to be so in one of the Reconstruction Acts. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at 74 (citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15, 20 (1831)).  
Writing for the Court in Georgia v. Stanton, Justice Nelson relied on a dictum of Chief 
Justice Marshall in Cherokee Nation.  In the earlier case, the Cherokee Nation had sought an 
injunction in the Court’s original jurisdiction against the implementation of Georgia 
legislation that, said Justice Nelson, “if permitted to be carried into execution, would 
have subverted the tribal government of the Indians; and subjected them to the jurisdiction 
of the State.”  Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 74.  The Court in Cherokee Nation 
found that the Cherokee Nation was not a state for purposes of the original 
jurisdiction.  30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20.  Justice Nelson said in Georgia v. Stanton that 
Marshall’s majority “intimated that the bill [in equity in the original jurisdiction] was 
untenable on another ground, namely, that it involved simply a political question.”  
Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 74 (quoting Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 
20).  Marshall was concerned that the request “to control the Legislature of Georgia, and 
to restrain the exertion of its physical force . . . savours too much of the exercise of political 
power to be within the proper province of the judicial department.”  Id.  Marshall’s 
reasoning in Cherokee Nation closely resembles the Court’s in Mississippi v. Johnson. 
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statements about jurisdiction, not all of which really concern the 
fundamentals of judicial power.  The interest of the plaintiff, however, 
does go to those fundamentals.  If there are interests that are 
categorically excluded from the judicial purview, then a plaintiff 
seeking the vindication of only such interests brings to court a matter 
with which the courts are not concerned.  When political rights fall 
into that excluded category, the Article III courts have no authority to 
give relief to protect them, whether that conclusion is explained under 
the rubric of standing or political rights or questions. 
It is hard to say how the Court today would apply its standing 
doctrine to the kind of sovereign interest asserted in Georgia v. Stanton.  
The main rationale for contemporary standing doctrine would not bar 
such a suit.  That rationale is that litigation concerning interests that 
are widely or universally shared, like the people’s interest in 
compliance with the law, should be controlled by politically 
accountable officers, not by self-appointed private litigants.252  When a 
state sues through its political officers, that requirement is met.  Quite 
possibly the current Court would think that a case like Georgia v. Stanton 
presents problems concerning the remedy, not the interest at stake. 
Whatever the status of rights of sovereignty may be today, one 
political interest definitely can support adjudication in Article III 
courts:  the right to vote.253  The category of interests that Article III 
courts do not protect may be different today from the 1860s, but the 
contemporary standing cases show that the category still exists. 
III.   THE LOWER COURTS’ JURISDICTIONAL  
POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE 
In the last few decades a substantial number of lower court decisions 
have seriously misunderstood the Supreme Court’s political question 
doctrine.  Several of the courts of appeals have decided cases that have 
the following characteristics:  (1) the case was dismissed under the 
political question doctrine for want of jurisdiction; (2) the plaintiff was 
a private person seeking relief on the basis of principles of liability that 
                                               
 252. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of 
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983).  In then-Judge Scalia’s view, the interests of 
the public at large—majorities as he puts it—should be protected by political actors, 
while the courts protect the rights of minorities who face distinct and particularized 
harm.  Id. at 894–95. 
 253. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962) (“A citizen’s right to a vote free 
of arbitrary impairment by state action has been judicially recognized as a right secured 
by the Constitution . . . .”). 
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apply between private persons; (3) the court found that granting the 
plaintiff relief would in some way be inconsistent with a policy decision 
concerning national security or foreign relations ostensibly made on 
behalf of the United States; (4) the plaintiff did not seek mandatory 
relief against the United States or one of its officials that would direct 
the performance of official functions; and (5) the court did not find 
that it was bound to treat as conclusive the application of law to fact by 
a political actor.254 
None of those decisions has any foundation in the political question 
doctrine as the Supreme Court has applied it, nor did any of those 
cases fall outside the federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction as 
constrained by Article III for the reason the court gave.  The version of 
the political question doctrine the lower courts have developed in 
those cases is unsound.255 
This Section will first give a number of examples of lower court cases 
that fit into the category just described.  It will then explain how they 
do not rest on the Supreme Court’s political question doctrine, nor on 
any plausible understanding of the judicial power under Article III. 
                                               
 254. Many lower court political question cases do not meet that description and are 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s doctrine as described in this article.  A significant 
number of cases do meet that description, and I think that any case that does is not a 
correct application of the Supreme Court’s precedents.  The description refers to 
principles that govern liability between private parties, and not just to suits between 
private parties, so as to include suits against the United States under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act and other waivers of sovereign immunity that make the federal government 
liable when a private defendant would be.  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2012) 
(providing that the U.S. government is liable in tort when a private person would be).  
I refer to liability, not damages, because the law that applies between private parties 
might give rise to declaratory or injunctive relief, as under the Sherman Act.  The 
important point is not that damages were sought, but that the remedy was not of the 
kind disapproved in Gilligan, a feature of the cases captured in the fourth part of the 
description. 
 255. To say that the lower courts’ doctrine is in error is not to say that any particular 
case was decided incorrectly.  First, cases that follow applicable circuit precedent 
cannot be faulted on the grounds that the precedent is incorrect.  Second, courts 
decide cases on the basis of the parties’ arguments, and often are under no obligation 
to identify an argument no party has made.  If all parties agree that the political 
question doctrine is a constitutional limit on jurisdiction, a court may be allowed to 
accept that conclusion.  It is also hard to say whether a court of appeals decides 
incorrectly when it follows a dictum from the Supreme Court that describes the Court’s 
cases, when the dictum is itself inaccurate.  As discussed above, the Court has said that 
its political question cases rest on a limit on the Article III jurisdiction, but that is not 
correct, and the Court has never relied on that principle as part of its reasoning in 
deciding a case. 
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A. Lower Court Political Question Cases 
In recent years, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has 
relied on the political question doctrine in deciding a number of cases 
in which the plaintiff sought recovery from the personal funds of 
current or former federal officials for actions connected with U.S. 
foreign or national security affairs.  A leading example is Schneider v. 
Kissinger,256 brought against former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
concerning decisions he made while serving as National Security 
Adviser to President Nixon.  Plaintiffs were the two sons and the estate 
of the late General Rene Schneider of Chile, who was killed in 1970.257  
According to the plaintiffs, General Schneider was murdered by 
members of Chile’s military with the encouragement of high U.S. 
officials, including Kissinger.258  The plaintiffs maintained that 
Kissinger was involved in arranging a military coup against Chilean 
President Salvador Allende, and that the success of the coup depended 
on eliminating General Schneider.259  The plaintiffs sought recovery 
against Kissinger personally on a number of tort claims.260 
The district court granted a motion to dismiss for want of subject 
matter jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed.261  Relying on 
four of what it characterized as the six factors set out in Baker, the court 
found that “this case raises political questions committed to the 
political branches and therefore is beyond the jurisdiction of the 
courts.”262  After Schneider, the D.C. Circuit dismissed on political 
                                               
 256. 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 257. Id. at 191. 
 258. Id. at 192. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 192–93.  Pursuant to the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (2012), the 
Attorney General certified that Kissinger had been acting within the scope of his office 
at the time of the events covered by the complaint and the United States was 
substituted as the defendant.  Schneider, 412 F.3d at 192–93.  Substitution of the United 
States under the Westfall Act is not an assertion of sovereign immunity, because 
Congress has waived sovereign immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which 
provides that, subject to certain exceptions, “the United States shall be liable . . . in the 
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.”  
28 U.S.C. § 2674.  Under the Westfall Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United 
States was liable only if Secretary Kissinger would have been liable personally.  The 
court of appeals in Schneider thus treated that case as if it were still against Kissinger 
personally for purposes of the political question doctrine. 
 261. Schneider, 412 F.3d at 191. 
 262. Id. at 198.  The court found that the suit “raises policy questions that are 
textually committed to a coordinate branch of government,” id. at 194, that there were 
no judicially discoverable or manageable standards under which to resolve it because 
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question grounds several more suits in which private parties sought 
damages from U.S. government officials for events arising out of U.S. 
intelligence activities.263 
The D.C. Circuit has also dismissed on political question grounds a 
claim for tort damages arising out of a U.S. military targeting decision.  
El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. United States264 was brought under 
the Federal Tort Claims Act to recover for the destruction of the 
plaintiff’s pharmaceutical plant in Sudan by U.S. military action.  
President Clinton explained in a radio address to the nation that the 
plant was targeted because it was believed to be associated with terrorist 
activities and used for the production of chemical weapons.265  
Plaintiffs maintained that the facility was civilian property not 
associated with terrorism and thus not a legitimate target under the 
law of war.266  The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, found that “[i]f the 
political question doctrine means anything in the arena of national 
security and foreign relations, it means the courts cannot assess the 
merits of the President’s decision to launch an attack on a foreign 
target, and the plaintiffs ask us to do just that.”267 
In recent years the courts of appeals have also dismissed on political 
question grounds suits against members of the military, and private 
military contractors, for alleged negligence in the conduct of military 
                                               
plaintiffs’ tort claims did “not provide standards for making or reviewing foreign policy 
judgments,” id. at 197, that “judicial resolution would require an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion” because “we would be 
forced to pass judgment on the policy-based decision of the executive to use covert 
action to prevent [the Allende] government from taking power,” id., and that the court 
“could not determine Appellants’ claims without passing judgment on the decision of 
the executive branch to participate in the alleged covert operations,” id. at 198. 
 263. Gonzalez-Vera v. Kissinger, 449 F.3d 1260 (D.C. Cir. 2006), like Schneider, arose 
out of U.S. support for the coup against President Allende in Chile.  Relying on 
Schneider, the court of appeals found that the district court lacked jurisdiction because 
the case presented a political question.  Id. at 1264–65.  In Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 
F.3d 427 (D.C. Cir. 2006), former residents of the island of Diego Garcia sued a 
number of former executive officials in their personal capacities, and the United States 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, claiming that they had been illegally removed from 
their homes.  Id. at 429–30.  Relying on Schneider, the court of appeals found that the 
case presented a political question and affirmed the district court’s dismissal for want 
of subject matter jurisdiction.  Id. at 437–38.  Harbury v. Hayden, 522 F.3d 413 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008), is another damages action involving U.S. foreign policy that was dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction on political question grounds.  Id. at 421. 
 264. 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 265. Id. at 838. 
 266. Id. at 838–40. 
 267. Id. at 844. 
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operations.  An example is Carmichael v. Kellogg Brown & Root Services, 
Inc.268  Carmichael was an action by Annette Carmichael, wife of 
Sergeant Keith Carmichael, who had become disabled as a result of 
injuries suffered while serving in Iraq.  In May 2004, Sergeant 
Carmichael was severely injured while riding in a truck operated by 
Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR) that was part of a military convoy 
traveling an extremely dangerous route.269  Annette Carmichael sued 
KBR in state court, alleging that the truck’s driver, a KBR employee, 
had been negligent.270  KBR removed the case to the U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of Georgia and moved to dismiss for want of 
jurisdiction under the political question doctrine.271  The district court 
granted the motion and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit affirmed.272  Relying on two of the so-called Baker factors, the 
Eleventh Circuit found that the district court lacked jurisdiction 
because the case presented a political question.273 
                                               
 268. 572 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 269. Id. at 1275–76, 1278. 
 270. Id. at 1278–79. 
 271. Id. at 1279. 
 272. Id.  The district court dismissed the case rather than remanding it to state 
court.  Section 1447(c) of Title 28 of the United States Code provides, “If at any time 
before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, 
the case shall be remanded.”  28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2012). 
 273. See Carmichael, 572 F.3d at 1296 (holding that inquiring into the cause of the 
accident would require the court to address matters assigned to other branches of 
government, a political question over which the court lacked jurisdiction).  Similar to 
Carmichael is Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root Services, 658 F.3d 402 (4th Cir. 2011), in 
which the Fourth Circuit found a lack of jurisdiction on political question grounds 
over a tort claim by a service member who had been severely injured, allegedly as a 
result of negligence by KBR employees in connection with U.S. military operations in 
Iraq.  Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root Services, 724 F.3d 458 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 1152 (2015), was a negligence claim by the parents and estate of a U.S. 
service member who was electrocuted while taking a shower in Iraq.  The district court 
dismissed for want of jurisdiction on political question grounds.  Id. at 463.  The Third 
Circuit found that a case against a private contractor could under certain 
circumstances be dismissed for want of jurisdiction on political question grounds, id. 
at 465–66, and discussed in depth the appropriate analysis under its reading of Baker 
v. Carr, id. at 466–82, and the application of that analysis to different claims under 
different possible sources of law.  The court of appeals ultimately concluded that the 
case depended on a choice of law question, which the district court had not resolved:  
if Pennsylvania law applied, the case contained no nonjusticiable issue, but if 
Tennessee or Texas law applied, some of the issues were nonjusticiable.  The court of 
appeals remanded the case so the district court could identify the applicable 
substantive law and apply the court of appeals’s reasoning.  Id. at 482. 
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Another decision treating the political question doctrine as a 
jurisdictional bar to claims of private liability is Spectrum Stores, Inc. v. 
Citgo Petroleum Corp.274  The plaintiffs, who were gasoline retailers, sued 
a number of petroleum production companies, some of which, like 
Citgo, are wholly or partially state-owned.275  The plaintiffs claimed that 
the defendants participated in conspiracies to fix prices and limit the 
production of oil in violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.276  
Although no governments were sued, the pricing and production 
decisions at issue were in large measure those of governments that are 
members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC).277  The Fifth Circuit concluded that the case should be 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on political question grounds.278  
Largely accepting the arguments in a Statement of Interest submitted 
by the Department of Justice on behalf of several cabinet departments, 
the Fifth Circuit found that “adjudication of this case would result in 
the frustration of various objectives ‘of vital interest to the United 
States’ national security.’”279  The court of appeals did not decide 
whether the federal statutes on which plaintiffs relied entitled them to 
relief against the defendants.280 
B. The Lower Court Cases and the Supreme Court’s Doctrine 
As I have explained, the Supreme Court’s political question doctrine 
has two branches, neither of which limits subject matter jurisdiction.  
The first, non-judicial finality, tells the courts how to decide cases, and 
sometimes tells them to withhold relief in a case over which they have 
jurisdiction.  The second, limits on prospective remedies, similarly 
instruct the courts to withhold relief in cases they are authorized to 
decide. 
                                               
 274. 632 F.3d 938 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 275. Id. at 942. 
 276. Id. at 944–45. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. at 948. 
 279. Id. at 951–52 (footnote omitted). 
 280. Id. at 956.  In addition to the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the D.C., Third, 
Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits, the Second and Ninth Circuits have also held that 
the political question doctrine imposes limits on the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
federal courts.  See, e.g., Saldana v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 774 F.3d 544, 555 
(9th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (dismissing for want of subject matter on political 
question grounds); Whiteman v. Dorotheum GmbH & Co. KG, 431 F.3d 57, 73–74 (2d 
Cir. 2005) (same). 
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The lower court cases with which I am concerned do not fall into 
either of those categories.  This Section will elaborate on the difference 
between the limited circumstances in which the political question 
doctrine limits the courts and the much more common circumstances 
in which the branches of government perform their ordinary 
functions.  In those more usual circumstances, courts apply law to fact 
on their own, and while they may decide whether an official’s 
discretionary act complied with the law, they do not themselves 
exercise discretion. 
Because they misunderstand Baker and the earlier cases it expounds, 
the courts of appeals routinely fail to recognize that the political 
question doctrine mainly turns on non-judicial finality.  Instead of 
looking for indicia that a political actor has been given authority to 
apply law to fact conclusively, as Justice Brennan did in Baker, they 
often find that the doctrine operates when the political branches have 
their usual relationship to the law, in which they are not final as the 
courts are.  Many of the cases involve rules of liability that apply directly 
to government decision makers and those acting at their direction.  Of 
course, the person who has a duty to comply with a legal rule is not in 
the position of a court; potential tortfeasors do not conclusively decide 
whether they have committed a tort.  Unlike an adjudicator, a potential 
tortfeasor need know nothing about the content of the law.  Someone 
who has never heard of negligence can take due care and so act 
lawfully, and a military commander with a very limited knowledge of 
the law of war can comply with it and so avoid personal liability.  Being 
held to a rule and being called on to determine whether it has been 
violated are very different functions.281 
Cases like Spectrum Stores involve executive officials who are charged with 
applying legal rules to someone else, but whose decisions nevertheless are 
not conclusive on that question the way that a court’s judgment is.  The 
executive branch enforces the antitrust laws, but when it brings a 
prosecution under the Sherman Act the court decides for itself 
whether the statute has been violated.  Non-judicial finality is very 
much the exception and not the rule, and when the political question 
doctrine is properly understood it will rarely be found to be applicable. 
                                               
 281. A similar distinction applies with respect to Congress, although the legal 
category involved is power and not duty.  In voting on legislation, members of Congress 
often make judgments about its constitutionality.  While the courts may give some level 
of deference to the legislature’s judgment, they are not absolutely bound thereby; if 
they were, judicial review as known in this country would not exist. 
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According to the Court, the political question rubric also applies 
when mandatory judicial remedies would intrude into political 
discretion.  Again misled by the famous passage from Baker, the lower 
courts have often failed to see the distinction the Court adumbrated in 
Scheuer.282  Legal rules, including rules that impose personal liability on 
executive officials, set the limits on official discretion.  When officials 
act within their discretion they have official privilege, but when they go 
outside it they do not and may be liable (though they may also be 
immune in close cases).283  Although the possibility of liability very 
likely will affect official conduct—indeed, that is one of its functions—
when the courts decide on the limits of discretion they do not usurp it.  
That is why the Court was untroubled by the possibility of ex post 
personal liability for military decisions in Scheuer, and in a dictum in 
Gilligan.284  The political question doctrine is implicated in cases like 
the latter, in which courts are asked to give mandatory remedies that 
go beyond enforcing rules that limit the Executive. 
                                               
 282. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247–48 (1973) (suggesting that executive 
officials do not have absolute personal immunity, but a qualified immunity from 
liability when their acts are not clearly unlawful). 
 283. The relations between government officials and the legal rules that enable and 
constrain them underlie so-called officer suits, in which private plaintiffs seek damages 
from the personal funds of government officials for allegedly illegal conduct under 
color of official authority.  Officials like law enforcement officers and members of the 
military involved in combat have privileges to inflict harm that ordinarily would be 
unlawful.  When they act beyond those privileges they are personally liable for harm 
they inflict.  See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388, 390–92 (1971) (describing officer suit structure).  An early case involving 
the privileges of combatants to invade private rights is Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 
Cranch) 170 (1804).  Captain Little of the U.S. Navy seized the Flying Fish and was sued 
for damages from his private funds by its owners, who claimed that he had exceeded 
the privilege to seize granted by Congress as part of the Quasi-War with France in the 
late 1790s.  The Court concluded that Congress had authorized seizures of vessels 
bound to French ports, but not those coming from French ports like the Flying Fish, 
and upheld an award of damages.  Id. at 176–79. 
  In addition to substantive privileges to invade private rights, like those of a 
lawful combatant who engages in hostilities within the law of war, officials often enjoy 
immunity from litigation for unlawful acts that they reasonably believed to have been 
lawful.  See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 244–45 (2009) (finding that 
police officers whose warrantless search was not clearly unlawful when conducted are 
entitled to qualified immunity). 
 284. See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 249 (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973)) 
(“Indeed, [in Gilligan] we specifically noted ‘that we neither held nor implied that the 
conduct of the National Guard is always beyond judicial review or that there may not 
be accountability in a judicial forum for . . . unlawful conduct by military 
personnel . . . .’”). 
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The lower court cases that go beyond non-judicial finality and limits on 
mandatory remedies thus have no warrant in the Supreme Court’s decisions. 
C. Jurisdictional Limits, Substantive Law, and Article III 
When the lower courts find that they lack jurisdiction on political 
question grounds they depart, not only from the Court’s precedents, 
but also from Article III. 
The lower court cases that find jurisdictional limits under the 
political question rubric rest on a fundamental confusion of the roles 
of substantive and jurisdictional law.  They have relied on a 
jurisdictional limitation to perform functions that can be performed 
only by the legal rules that set out the authority of executive officers 
and determine whether the conduct of those officers and others is 
lawful.  One of the functions that only the substantive rules can 
perform is the role the lower courts attribute to the political question 
doctrine itself:  ensuring that the courts respect the lawful authority of 
the political branches. 
When the lower courts treat the political question doctrine as a limit 
on their jurisdiction, as they do in the decisions with which I am 
concerned, the doctrine thereby keeps them from applying the 
substantive rules that govern the plaintiff’s claim, and in particular the 
substantive legal rules that determine whether the defendant’s 
conduct was lawful.  For example, when the defendant is a member of 
the U.S. military and the conduct at issue is related to combat, the 
lower courts’ doctrine keeps them from deciding whether the 
defendant was entitled to combatant privilege under the law of war.  
Combatant privilege permits actions that otherwise would be tortious 
or criminal, and is central to the lawfulness of war.285  Without 
                                               
 285.  
International law affords combatants a special legal immunity from the 
domestic law of the enemy State for their actions done in accordance with the 
law of war.  This legal immunity is sometimes called the “combatant’s 
privilege” or “combatant immunity.”  This means that a combatant’s “killing, 
wounding, or other warlike acts are not individual crimes or offenses,” if they 
are done under military authority and are not prohibited by the law of war.  
Similarly, a combatant’s warlike acts done under military authority and in 
accordance with the law of war also do not create civil liability. 
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL 108 (2015) (hereinafter LAW OF WAR 
MANUAL), http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/Law-of-War-Manual-June-2015.pdf 
(footnotes omitted) (quoting E.D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant Gen., Gen. Orders 
No. 100, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE 
FIELD art. 57 (1898)); W. Thomas Mallison & Sally V. Mallison, The Juridical Status of 
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jurisdiction over a claim, a court cannot decide whether that privilege 
was available or not. 
Combatant privilege is part of a large body of rules that govern 
official conduct related to national security and foreign relations.  
Related principles apply to the activities of private persons who 
participate in government operations, such as military contractors.286  
Conceived yet more broadly, foreign relations and national security 
law includes all the rules that bear on the foreign affairs and military 
operations of the United States.  The Sherman Act is part of that law, 
especially because its so-called extraterritorial application can have 
major consequences for relations between the United States and other 
sovereigns.287  Not all the legal rules that regulate or affect foreign 
relations and national security are federal law.  In a tort action, the 
plaintiff’s claim may arise from the law of the place of the tort, which 
may be a foreign country, or from the law of the plaintiff’s domicile, 
which may be a state of the union.288  But if federal law is applicable it 
ultimately controls in any American court.  In a tort action growing out 
of military operations, the plaintiff’s claim may come from non-federal 
law, but the defendant’s combatant privilege may be based on statute 
or federal common law.289 
                                               
Privileged Combatants Under the Geneva Protocol of 1977 Concerning International Conflicts, 
42 DUKE J. LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 5 (1978) (stating that individuals who enjoy 
combatant privilege have “the legal right, limited by the laws and customs of war, to 
exercise coercion and violence in a public armed conflict situation”). 
 286. The law of war recognizes a distinct category of “persons authorized to 
accompany the armed forces,” which includes civilian government employees and 
government contractors.  LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 285, at 142, 144. 
 287. In F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004), the 
Supreme Court read the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act consistent with its 
practice to construe “ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the 
sovereign authority of other nations” because “America’s antitrust laws, when applied 
to foreign conduct, can interfere with a foreign nation’s ability independently to 
regulate its own commercial affairs.”  Id. at 164–65. 
 288. Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 658 F.3d 402, 405 n.6 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(noting that the parties agreed that Virginia law applied to Taylor’s negligence claim). 
 289. The federal source of federal officers’ official privilege was central to the 
important case of In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890), in which Deputy U.S. Marshal David 
Neagle sought discharge through habeas corpus from state custody on a murder 
charge.  Id. at 3–6.  Neagle had been appointed as a bodyguard for Justice Field and 
had killed David Terry when, the Court found, Terry assaulted Field.  Id. at 52–53.  The 
Court found that Neagle was eligible for relief through habeas corpus because he had 
an “element of power and authority asserted under the government of the United 
States.”  Id. at 54.  For that reason, Neagle was being held in state custody for “an act 
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Taken together, those principles perform the primary function of 
legal rules:  they determine whether conduct is lawful.  When courts 
apply them, those principles perform two other functions specifically 
related to the role of the judiciary in the constitutional system.  First, 
by applying the substantive law of national security and foreign 
relations, courts respect the discretion of the political branches, 
including the Executive.  By applying statutes that Congress has validly 
adopted, courts implement the legislature’s policy decisions.  Many 
rules confer some kind of authority on executive officials.  Combatant 
privilege does so, by making lawful all legitimate acts of hostility; within 
the bounds set by the law, military decision makers may choose the 
strategy and tactics they think best suited to accomplishing the nation’s 
goals. 
Second, by applying the substantive law relating to foreign relations 
and national security, courts avoid interfering with, and to some extent 
help implement, the foreign and national security policy of the United 
States.  For example, the foreign policy of the United States is that 
foreign sovereigns may be sued by private parties with respect to their 
commercial activities.  The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act adopts 
the so-called restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, according to 
which sovereigns have immunity for their governmental conduct but 
not for their dealings in the marketplace.290  Congress endorsed that 
approach to immunity when it adopted the statute, and the federal 
courts both respect and implement Congress’s choice when they apply 
the relevant substantive law, like the law of contract, to cases in which 
foreign governments are properly sued.  A court that refused to hear 
such a case would disrupt U.S. foreign policy. 
Only substantive rules can fully perform those three functions; 
jurisdictional limits cannot do so.  That is clear with respect to 
determining whether conduct is lawful, which substantive rules 
accomplish and jurisdictional limits prevent.  Perhaps less obvious, but 
crucial in assessing the lower courts’ political question cases, is that 
only by applying substantive rules can the judiciary properly respect 
political discretion and U.S. policy.  A court can defer to discretionary 
                                               
done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the United States” as required to be eligible 
for relief under the habeas corpus statute.  Id. at 41. 
 290. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 690–91 (2004) (noting that 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act adopts the restrictive theory of sovereign 
immunity). 
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choices by the political branches only if it knows the scope of their 
discretion, which only substantive rules can tell it. 
Two of the lower court cases illustrate this point.  In Schneider, the 
D.C. Circuit concluded that the political question doctrine deprived it 
of jurisdiction, and that the doctrine did so in order to protect 
executive discretion and U.S. foreign policy from judicial 
interference.291  Because it did not address the merits, however, the 
court was not in a position to decide whether there had been a 
legitimate exercise of executive discretion and therefore was not in a 
position to know what U.S. foreign policy was.  If the Constitution and 
laws of the United States authorized the National Security Advisor to 
encourage the elimination of a foreign political figure, then even if 
Secretary Kissinger did what the plaintiffs claimed he did, his acts were 
within his discretion and constituted the foreign policy of the United 
States.  If Secretary Kissinger lacked that authorization, then the court 
was neither respecting executive discretionary choices nor giving 
appropriate deference to foreign policy; it was allowing lawless acts by 
individuals to avoid the liability imposed by the substantive law. 
Spectrum Stores is similar.  The plaintiffs claimed that actions of 
foreign firms, some of them owned by governments, violated U.S. 
antitrust statutes.  The court of appeals agreed with the executive 
branch that the court had no jurisdiction because the policy of the 
United States was to manage through negotiations issues concerning 
foreign sovereigns’ decisions with respect to their natural resources.292  
Those positions contradicted one another, and the contradiction 
could be resolved only by deciding the merits and in particular by 
deciding whether the Sherman Act applied as the plaintiffs said it did.  
If the plaintiffs were right, and the antitrust statutes are constitutional 
                                               
 291. See Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 292.  
By adjudicating this case, the panel would be reexamining critical foreign policy 
decisions, including the Executive Branch’s longstanding approach of 
managing relations with foreign oil-producing states through diplomacy rather 
than private litigation, as discussed in the government’s amicus brief and in 
several official statements of administration policy.  In accordance with this 
policy, the Department of Justice has, upon thorough consideration, declined 
to bring a Sherman Act case on behalf of the United States.  Any merits ruling 
in this case, whether it vindicates or condemns the acts of OPEC member 
nations, would reflect a value judgment on their decisions and actions—a 
diplomatic determination textually committed to the political branches. 
Spectrum Stores, Inc. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 632 F.3d 938, 951 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(footnote omitted). 
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in that respect, then the foreign policy of the United States on this 
topic is not limited to negotiation, but includes liability to private 
parties.  When it acts within its constitutional sphere, Congress sets the 
foreign policy of this country, and limits the discretion of the 
Executive.293  For all the Fifth Circuit knew in Spectrum Stores, the court’s 
decision departed from a foreign policy choice made by the institution 
authorized to act for the United States.  Only by interpreting the statutes, 
which it declined to do, could the court of appeals achieve the goals it set 
out to achieve, of ensuring that it implemented U.S. foreign policy. 
The court of appeals in Spectrum Stores might have encountered a 
constitutional question concerning legislative and executive power 
had it decided the merits.  It might have found that the antitrust 
statutes authorize the kind of lawsuits the executive branch maintained 
would be disruptive to U.S. foreign policy.  It then would have found 
itself with the kind of question the Supreme Court resolved on the 
merits in Zivotofsky v. Kerry (Zivotofsky II).294  In Zivotofsky II, the plaintiff 
claimed an entitlement under a statute that, the executive branch 
maintained, impermissibly interfered with the President’s 
constitutional authority.295  The Court agreed with the executive 
branch, and found the statute unconstitutional.296  It did so after 
having reversed the court of appeals’s dismissal of the suit on political 
question grounds in Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky I).297  The political 
question doctrine does not keep the courts from deciding whether 
                                               
 293. In Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986), plaintiffs 
sought an order requiring the Secretary of Commerce to make a statutorily required 
certification that Japan’s whaling activities undermined the effectiveness of quotas set 
by international convention.  Id. at 228.  The executive branch had concluded an 
executive agreement with Japan concerning Japan’s whaling policy and had 
determined that whaling by Japan in compliance with the agreement would not 
undermine the quotas.  Id. at 227–28.  Rejecting the argument that the case presented 
a nonjusticiable political question, the Court explained that “interpreting 
congressional legislation is a recurring and accepted task for the federal courts.  It is 
also evident that the challenge to the Secretary’s decision not to certify Japan for 
harvesting whales in excess of [International Whaling Commission] quotas presents a 
purely legal question of statutory interpretation.”  Id. at 230.  When Congress legislates 
within its constitutional authority, the Executive must implement Congress’s choices, 
and the courts will enforce that duty in appropriate cases. 
 294. 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
 295. Id. at 2083–84. 
 296. Id. at 2096. 
 297. 566 U.S. 189 (2012). 
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Congress has validly constrained executive discretion with respect to 
foreign affairs.298 
The phrases that the courts of appeals have carried over from Baker 
very likely have confused them on this point, often causing them to 
assume their conclusion.  They often say that foreign relations or 
national security matters are textually committed to the Executive, 
which is at best a half truth.299  No text gives U.S. military personnel a 
privilege to commit war crimes.  Whether the Constitution or any 
statute authorizes the National Security Adviser to conspire to arrange 
a homicide was a crucial question in Schneider, and the invocation of 
general commitment of foreign relations to the President cannot 
answer it.  Executive officials set and carry out the foreign policy of the 
United States only when they act within their lawful authority, which 
does not include all the acts they commit under color of law.300 
Substantive principles also hold the solution to a problem several 
courts of appeals have thought they faced in political question cases.  
                                               
 298.  
The federal courts are not being asked to supplant a foreign policy decision 
of the political branches with the courts’ own unmoored determination of 
what United States policy toward Jerusalem should be.  Instead, Zivotofsky 
requests that the courts enforce a specific statutory right.  To resolve his claim, 
the Judiciary must decide if Zivotofsky’s interpretation of the statute is correct, 
and whether the statute is constitutional.  This is a familiar judicial exercise. 
Zivotofsky I, 566 U.S. at 196. 
 299.  
As the Supreme Court suggested in Marbury and made clear in later cases, 
“The conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the 
Constitution to the Executive and Legislative—’the political’—Departments 
of the Government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of 
this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” 
Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Oetjen v. Cent. 
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)).  Most constitutional grants of authority to 
Congress and the President do not involve the quasi-adjudicatory function that leads 
to non-judicial finality under the political question doctrine.  See id. at 195.  Oetjen is an 
exception to that generalization, because it involved recognition of a foreign 
government, which is quasi-adjudicatory and does give rise to non-judicial finality.  The 
statement the D.C. Circuit quoted from Oetjen was correct in its context, but not 
applicable in all contexts. 
 300. Action under color of law can be unlawful.  For example, the Supreme Court has 
held that the Constitution itself imposes tort liability on federal officials.  See Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).  Because 
it is imposed on federal officials as such, that liability attaches only to conduct under 
color of law, and not to conduct in a wholly personal capacity.  Because it is tort liability, 
it applies to conduct that is not actually legally authorized; if an act is authorized, the 
actor enjoys official privilege to engage in it and is not personally liable. 
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Drawing on Baker’s reference to judicially manageable standards, a 
number of cases have found that the legal rule on which the plaintiff 
relied cannot be applied by the federal courts because it requires that 
they second-guess foreign policy or national security choices in ways 
that would go beyond the judicial role.301  Few if any rules of liability 
on which a plaintiff may rely are likely to put such demands on the 
courts.  Ordinary tort negligence almost certainly does not do so.  
Negligent conduct creates an unreasonable risk.302  Courts routinely 
decide whether law enforcement officers acted reasonably in making 
split-second decisions with life and death in the balance.303  Military 
judgments are similar. 
If somehow the law on which the plaintiff relies calls on a court to 
make a military or foreign policy judgment that federal courts may not 
make, principles of official privilege can obviate the problem by 
incorporating deference to official judgment.  The more deference the 
courts give official decision makers, the less the judges are substituting 
their own judgment for those of the Executive.  The privilege of federal 
officials derives from the Constitution, federal statutes, or unwritten 
federal law.  The Supreme Court has interpreted the latter two sources 
of legal rules so as to provide military decision makers with appropriate 
                                               
 301. For example, Aktepe v. United States, 105 F.3d 1400 (11th Cir. 1997), was a 
damages claim by members of the Turkish Navy for wrongful death and personal injury 
arising out of an accident in a training exercise with the U.S. Navy.  Id. at 1401–02.  
Suit was brought pursuant to statutory waivers of sovereign immunity and the 
applicable substantive law was that of wrongful death.  Id. at 1402.  The Eleventh 
Circuit found that the case presented a nonjusticiable political question in part 
because “no judicially discoverable and manageable standards exist for resolving the 
questions raised by this suit.  In order to determine whether the Navy conducted the 
missile firing drill in a negligent manner, a court would have to determine how a 
reasonable military force would have conducted the drill.”  Id. at 1404.  As discussed 
above, Baker used the lack of judicially manageable standards as an indicator of non-
judicial finality. 
 302. The law of negligence protects bodily security against “against unintentional 
invasion by conduct involving in the thought of reasonable men an unreasonable 
hazard that such invasion would ensue.”  Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 
99 (N.Y. 1928), reh’g denied 164 N.E. 564 (1928). 
 303. In Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), the Supreme Court considered 
whether a law enforcement official can, consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment, attempt to stop a fleeing motorist from continuing his public-
endangering flight by ramming the motorist’s car from behind.  Put another 
way:  Can an officer take actions that place a fleeing motorist at risk of serious 
injury or death in order to stop the motorist’s flight from endangering the 
lives of innocent bystanders? 
Id. at 374. 
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protection from undue judicial second-guessing.304  The courts have at 
least as much flexibility in shaping unwritten federal law as they do in 
interpreting written federal law, and they can derive requirements of 
deference from the general principle that official privilege exists in 
order to enable officers to perform their function effectively. 
Substantive rules have another feature that points up the error of 
the lower courts’ jurisdictional doctrine:  they apply in state court, 
where the limits of Article III do not.  If the lower courts are right, the 
federal judiciary is barred from deciding highly sensitive issues and 
cases that the state courts are free to decide as far as federal law is 
concerned.  Had the plaintiffs in Schneider sued Secretary Kissinger in 
New York state court, no federal rule would have kept the court from 
deciding the case, but federal principles of privilege, immunity, and 
deference would have protected Kissinger from liability that would 
unduly interfere with his federal function.  State courts follow their 
own rules about jurisdiction, but when they have it, Article VI requires 
that they apply federal law that governs the relations of the parties.305 
The lower courts’ jurisdictional political question doctrine thus 
subverts Article III’s purpose and does not implement it.  The 
Constitution provides for federal courts so that federal law, federal 
interests, and federal officials will have an impartial forum free from 
local prejudice.306  Those courts can perform that function only if they 
                                               
 304. In Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983), the Court found that special factors 
counseled against inferring a cause of action under the Constitution for service 
members against their superior officers.  Id. at 298, 305.  In Feres v. United States, 340 
U.S. 135 (1950), the Court concluded that the Federal Tort Claims Act does not make 
the United States liable for injuries arising out of military service.  Id. at 146. 
 305.  
The requirement that a state court of competent jurisdiction treat federal law 
as the law of the land does not necessarily include within it a requirement that 
the State create a court competent to hear the case in which the federal claim 
is presented.  The general rule, “bottomed deeply in belief in the importance 
of state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state 
courts as it finds them.” 
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990) (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations 
Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 508 (1954)). 
 306. Cases involving foreign relations and national security generally turn on 
federal law and affect this country’s foreign relations.  Hamilton regarded as axiomatic 
“the propriety of the judicial power of a government being coextensive with its 
legislative,” noting that “[t]he mere necessity of uniformity in the interpretation of the 
national laws, decides the question.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 412 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (George W. Carey and James McClellan, eds., 2001).  The importance of a 
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have jurisdiction.  Article III and the statutes give them jurisdiction in 
a wide range of cases involving foreign relations and national security, 
and a version of the political question doctrine that denies that 
jurisdiction departs from the Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
As the Supreme Court has developed it, the political question 
doctrine implements limits on the judicial power but not on the cases 
Article III courts may decide.  The doctrine reflects the quite limited 
assignments of final decisional authority to political actors, and the 
basic but rarely relevant principle that courts may not exercise political 
power through their mandatory remedies.  In both respects, it tells 
courts how to decide cases, and then leaves them to decide the disputes 
that are within their jurisdiction.  The doctrine reflects a coherent view 
of the nature and limits of the federal judicial power, but to take it as 
a limit on the cases federal courts may decide is an easy but serious 
error.  John Marshall said that no political question could be made in 
his court, not that his tribunal could not decide any case involving a 
political question. 
 
                                               
federal forum for cases affecting U.S. foreign relations “rests on this plain proposition, 
that the peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a PART.”  Id. 
